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Pathways to a low-carbon future

Wang Tao, Jim Watson — Fri, 03 Jul 2009 05:51:00 -0400

China has a number of potential sustainable development paths, but none of them will be easy to achieve. This is the conclusion of a recent report by Wang Tao and Jim Watson, which develops a set of low-carbon scenarios to 2100.

China's continuous economic growth over the past 30 years has significantly improved the living standards of many of its citizens. The Chinese government claims that 400 million people were lifted out of poverty between 1980 and 2000, and GDP per capita has increased five times since 1981. Alongside economic expansion, China has also experienced a large increase in energy demand, especially after its economy moved into a stage of heavy industrialisation and urbanisation early this century.

This dramatic increase in energy demand, most of which is met by the use of coal, meant that China became the world’s largest carbon dioxide (CO₂) emitter in 2006. China’s recent energy demand growth has also led to concerns about energy supply, local and regional environmental pollution and social stability. China’s participation is a key to the success of a post-2012 international climate framework. However, such a framework must incorporate the development needs of China and other developing countries. This raises a fundamental question: can China develop within the tight global carbon emissions constraints that climate science now says are necessary?

The Tyndall Centre’s recent research on China’s low carbon development paths has explored this question, and the results are summarised in a new report: China’s Energy Transition. The report investigates the potential trajectories of carbon emissions that China could follow to achieve a given global climate change target. The report investigates in detail how these emission trajectories could be achieved, through changes in China’s economy and society, and the policies and technologies that shape the country’s energy system.

The target for China used in the report is a cumulative emissions budget over the twenty-first century. This is derived from a global target of stabilising the atmospheric concentration of CO₂at 450 parts per million (ppm). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) latest assessment, achieving this target would mean that the world has a significant chance of avoiding some of the worst impacts of climate change. The total global budget is 490 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) over the twenty-first century. The report analyses four scenarios that are based on two different apportionment approaches for global emissions: namely equal emissions per capita and equal emissions intensity of GDP. Within this, China is given a cumulative emission budget ranging from 70 GtC under the former approach, to 111 GtC under the latter. These approaches were just used to provide an illustrative range for China’s potential cumulative emissions under a given global target rather than argue for legitimate carbon emission share for China. Combined with different medium-term carbon emissions pathways, these budgets imply that China would reach a peak in its emissions between 2020 and 2030, followed by a decline. The four scenarios for China with their different emissions trajectories are shown in Figure 1 (labelled S1, S2, S3 and S4).

Figure 1: Carbon emissions in China: historic data, projections and Tyndall scenarios

The four scenarios analysed in the report are distinctive from each other, but in general are divided by their relative positions on two critical issues: promoting innovation, and the approach to social inequality. This report is not intended to be prescriptive about which of these budgets – or the many alternative pathways – China should follow. The scenarios are designed to illustrate some of the possibilities, and what the consequences of these might be for investment, economic structure and policy if they were followed. The research does not reach a firm conclusion on which scenario is the most desirable.

Within the scenarios, the Chinese economy in 2050 grows to between 8 and 13 times larger than that of today (see Figure 2). The economy in every scenario is dominated by the service sector, as is the case in most of today’s industrialised countries. The structure of other industries varies between the scenarios. In scenarios S1 and S2, high technology and high value-added industries will become the largest subsector in industry, while the other two scenarios will see more contributions from conventional and heavy industries. The total primary energy demand for 2050 also varies among scenarios, ranging from only 15% higher than 2005, to twice the 2005 level.

As a result, the energy intensity of Chinese economy is reduced by 76% to 87% between now and 2050, while carbon intensity is cut further to just 4% to 7% of the 2005 level. China’s carbon emissions rise to between 24% and 72% higher than 2005 by 2020 and subsequently decline to between 15% and 70% less than the 2005 level by 2050. Among all the sectors of the Chinese economy, transportation has the highest growth within the scenarios. Changes in households and industry also hold the key to a successful transition to low-carbon development in the next few decades.
Figure 2: Growth of total gross value-added of Chinese economy in each scenario

Within the Tyndall Centre scenarios, renewable energy plays a much bigger role in China’s energy system in 2050, adding to a more diverse energy structure. Coal reduces from more than 60% in 2005 to around 30% in total primary energy demand, while oil and gas continue their steady growth in the energy mix. Nuclear has the most diverse picture, from negligible in S2 to more than 12% in S3. This reflects different priorities between advanced renewables, such as wind and solar photovoltaics (PV), and nuclear for low-carbon energy supply. Even with a similar level of renewable energy in the scenarios, there is still large variance in technology choice within the renewable options, as well as in the way they are deployed (for example, in centralised facilities or in small-scale micro-generation).

Renewables contribute 37% to 61% of electricity generation in 2050 and differences exist in specific renewable sources in each scenario. For example, the power generating capacity in S2 in 2050 is more than 3,000 gigawatts, four times today’s size. Within this, more than a quarter is from solar and another 22% from wind (Figure 3). This implies an increase at about 10% every year for wind power and 16% every year for solar power between 2010 and 2050. A large portfolio of renewable energy could significantly improve some aspects of China’s energy security, for instance by reducing the exposure to fossil-fuel price volatility. Stability of the energy system with large contributions from renewables will be a serious issue, but could be managed with smarter grid technologies.

Figure 3: Power generation capacity and percentage of each source in 2050 (S2)

Even with the huge expansion of renewables, coal- and gas-fired power generation still account for 34% in this scenario. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) therefore becomes a crucial technology in helping China to develop within a carbon budget. CCS is not assumed to be implemented on a large scale in China until 2030, and will have to be diffused quickly so that decarbonisation of the power system could be achieved in these scenarios. By 2050, CCS will have to be installed on 80% to 90% of fossil-fuelled power plants in scenarios S3 and S4, in which coal will account for higher percentage of power generation than in S2. This means that action is required now, on an international basis, to assist China with the demonstration of CCS technologies. It is also important for China to bear in mind the need to retrofit CCS at a later date when new coal-fired power plants are built.

Energy demand from households and transport will continue their growth in all scenarios as living standards increase in China. Energy-efficiency improvements in appliances and buildings, and contributions from micro-renewables will help to reduce emissions growth from household sectors. High-carbon energy sources, such as coal, will be completely phased out from household use by 2050. The transport system becomes a major carbon emissions source in all scenarios due to high demand growth as well as the difficulty of decarbonisation. Private road transport accounts for most of this growth. But in some scenarios climate-change impacts are reduced with demand-side changes – in mobility patterns, for instance; large scale-ups in of alternative fuel use – such as electricity and sustainable biofuels; and significant developments in public transport.

Renewables contribute 37% to 61% of electricity generation in 2050 and differences exist in specific renewable sources in each scenario. For example, the power generating capacity in S2 in 2050 is more than 3,000 gigawatts, four times today’s size. Within this, more than a quarter is from solar and another 22% from wind (Figure 3). This implies an increase at about 10% every year for wind power and 16% every year for solar power between 2010 and 2050. A large portfolio of renewable energy could significantly improve some aspects of China’s energy security, for instance by reducing the exposure to fossil-fuel price volatility. Stability of the energy system with large contributions from renewables will be a serious issue, but could be managed with smarter grid technologies.

The scenario analysis is intended to inform policy-making both in China and in international climate-change negotiations. Some of the key policy implications of the report’s analysis follow:

• Decoupling carbon emissions growth from economic development in China is challenging, but is in principle achievable – and there is more than one way to realise it. The four scenarios demonstrate different ways to square China’s continuing development within a carbon emissions constraint, with different priorities in governmental decision making, infrastructure investments and social preferences.

• It is vital to start slowing emissions growth as early as possible. This will maximise China’s room for manoeuvre in deciding when it is appropriate for emissions to peak. The later the slowdown in emissions growth and the peak, the more difficult it will be for China in the future. Furthermore, later peaks are often associated with steeper subsequent reductions in emissions, which are likely to be more challenging for policy and social stability. Our analysis clearly demonstrates that 2040 is too late: a peak in Chinese emissions between 2020 and 2030 is therefore a plausible contribution that China could make to global action to stabilise the climate.

• The success and speed of economic and industrial structural change towards a more balanced economy – with a greater role for services and high tech industries – is likely to be crucial to China’s low-carbon development. This fits well with recent policy pronouncements of the Chinese government, which is keen that China moves away from its recent energy-intensive development path. The storylines associated with the scenarios suggest that economic growth could be much faster, more sustainable and resilient to external shocks in scenarios where this shift is implemented more quickly.

• Energy efficiency is vital, but the challenges vary across different scenarios. Currently the largest potential for energy efficiency improvement lies in China’s industries. But the fast growing demand for energy in the household and transport sectors points to the need for early action on efficiency in these sectors too if China’s overall efficiency targets are to be met.

• The transition to a low-carbon development pathway does not only depend on technology choices. Social choices and the potential carbon lock-in associated with life styles and behaviour patterns will have significant impacts on future emissions. Encouraging low-carbon lifestyles and consumption within China’s growing middle class could have a strong exemplary effect on the wider population regarding the development pathways that are desirable. This is an essential aspect of China’s future story that should be addressed alongside measures for low-carbon investment, institutional change and policy incentives.

• While a focus on China’s potential future carbon emission trajectories is very important in terms of climate change, these scenarios have wider implications: they include potentially important impacts on the availability of fossil and non-fossil energy resources as well as other natural resources, such as water and land use. It is also important to consider the energy-security threats that China faces.

The pathways for low carbon development illustrated by the Tyndall Centre scenarios have a particular resonance in the context of the current economic crisis. As in many other countries, there is an active debate within China about the extent to which economic stimulus packages to tackle the crisis can encourage more sustainable forms of development. Low-carbon development not only means the deployment of low-carbon technologies in China, but also presents an opportunity for China to build low-carbon industries and new institutions to foster low-carbon innovation. There are increasing signs that Chinese firms could soon develop world-leading capabilities in key low-carbon technologies, such as wind power. But even if such potential is realised, developed countries still have an obligation to make good on their repeated promises to assist developing countries like China with technology and finance. Without such assistance, there is a greater risk that China will not move fast enough towards the low-carbon development pathway that is necessary to enable the world to avoid the most dangerous consequences of climate change.

For more details, please download the full report here: China’s Energy Transition: Pathways for Low Carbon Development.

Dr Tao Wang is research fellow at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and Sussex Energy Group at SPRU, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. Contact him: tao [dot] wang [at] sussex.ac.uk

Dr Jim Watson is Director of the Sussex Energy Group at SPRU and deputy leader of the Tyndall Centre's Climate Change and Energy Programme. Contact him: w [dot] j [dot] watson [at] sussex.ac.uk

Homepage photo by Madiko83

In the US, a changing climate?

China Dialogue — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 11:56:00 -0400

What does proposed new legislation in the United States mean for the global fight against climate change? Our writers reflect.

[Produced in association with Rutgers Climate and Social Policy Initiative]

A moment worthy of reflection

Last Friday’s approval by the US House of Representatives of the Waxman-Markey bill (or American Clean Energy and Security Act) deserves a moment of quiet reflection. As someone who has followed the internal politics, it is hard to convey quite how dicey this looked a few months ago. The bill is far from perfect: the 2020 target is too low and too many permits are assigned gratis. But none of that matters.

If something like this bill survives the Senate, it will be good enough to set the United States on a unilateral path to de-carbonisation. Never mind that the levels will likely turn out to be too conservative. With a basic mechanism in place to internalise the costs of carbon, we can always ratchet up the targets as reality sets in.

And the same is true for the rest of the world. This bill, if it becomes law before the end of the year, may set a low bar for other countries to sign on to. However, once there is consensus on a way forward, it will be easier to push collectively for a steeper rate of de-carbonisation. Easier, but by no means easy.

There has been a Faustian deal in selling this legislation so that it can address climate change while sustaining economic growth. That may be true in the short run. But in the long run, internalising the true cost of carbon will extract a high price and an uneven one at that, as some sectors of economy will be more affected than others.

For developed economies, there will be enough surplus wealth to ease the transition for those most affected. But the developing world is a wholly different story: there, the costs (in terms of lowered rates of economic development) will be much larger and more difficult to offset than most are willing to admit. As such, the real challenge may not be so much getting an agreement, as sticking to it.

-- Martin Bunzl directs the Initiative on Climate change and Social Policy at Rutgers University

A failed role model

If the Waxman-Markey bill is passed into law, greenhouse-gas emissions will be cut by 17% by 2020 from 2005 levels. However, greenhouse-gas emissions in the United States have climbed by 15.8% since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. A 17% reduction from 2005 levels would mean barely reaching 1990 emissions levels.

Barack Obama, therefore, has not achieved enough in terms of addressing climate change, and I find this unacceptable. Why? Because the United States acts as a role model. If it merely reduces its emissions by 17%, other countries – including Japan, Canada, Russia and Australia – may use it as an excuse to lower their reduction targets.

Australia has already voiced doubts about its climate-change commitments. Canada, like Russia, has claimed it cannot make the same emissions reductions as other countries, since the country is more reliant on fuel for heating and transportation due to its vast landmass and cold climate. The emissions reduction target set by the European Union is even lower than that advocated in China. Therefore, we hope to see the United States go further than a 17% emissions reduction.

Moreover, with regards to financial support, although the United States has unveiled a US$787 billion economic stimulus package, it has not promised the developing world any financial support for tackling climate change. We should not anticipate any financial support from the United States, especially since the financial crisis has affected the country.

-- Yang Fuqiang directs Global Climate Change Solutions at WWF International

Reclaiming leadership

The United States has done more than any other country to create climate change, now it has a responsibility to lead in searching for a solution. But after the unprecedented disasters of the Bush administration, the country must walk before it can run.

The US is not yet in a position to be a leader in global negotiations. After eight years in the wilderness, outside of the Kyoto process, this should not come as a surprise to anyone. The country is suffering from inertia domestically, where Congress is having trouble producing adequate legislation in time for the Copenhagen talks. Internationally, the negotiating team is only just beginning to re-engage.

In the short term, the United States should concentrate on trying to lead in specific areas. One of the most positive early actions of the Obama administration has been their engagement with China on climate change. Together, the US and China could lead on designing, producing and manufacturing low-carbon technologies.

A cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the largest historical emitter of greenhouse-gases and the largest current emitter would be a very strong basis on which to build a truly global climate regime.

-- Tan Copsey is development manager at chinadialogue.net

Produced in association with:

Homepage photo by John Quigley/Spectral Q

A sustainable path for Nepal

Gagan Thapa, Kashish Das Shresth — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 07:13:00 -0400

How can a developing country make sustainability a part of its political constitution? Just over a year since Nepal was declared a republic, Gagan Thapa and Kashish Das Shresth address the country’s need for action on climate change.

It has been little over a year since Nepal was declared a democratic republic; the burden of responsibilities weighs more now than ever on the country’s policy-makers. Throughout this time, the conversation among the framers of Nepal’s new constitution has been predominantly – and rightly – about delivering people’s aspirations: principally, social justice and development. One is not possible with the other, and Nepal’s policy-makers must also consider the implications of their relationships with the environment and sustainability. To not also consider all of these issues would seriously undermine the longevity of the policies Nepal hopes to draft into its new constitution.

Our natural environment and the changes it experiences are the defining issues of the era. Environmental problems not only affect Nepal’s poor and marginalised, but every Nepali. The policies that we create to safeguard our environment are at the core of Nepal’s ambition to deliver social justice and development. However, they are not given the attention required by policymakers.

Issues surrounding food security, health, land use and development are all directly linked to climate change. Reports say that developing nations will be hit hardest by climate change. And even within poor countries like Nepal, the poorest and most marginalised communities will be the worst affected. This is a problem that we have inherited and will hand down to future generations – with added “interest” – if immediate action is not taken to address environmental concerns.

Let us look at the topics that are the most important for social justice: rights to food, good health, land and a home. Until the 1970s, Nepal was self-sufficient in its food production and supply. But today – for various reasons, including population growth and mismanagement of resources – food insecurity is a chronic problem in Nepal. Last year’s food crisis led to protests, riots and strict food export policies in countries around the world. Subsequent reports have raised concerns that unless we pay attention to climate change, it will cause further havoc for our food supply.

Nepal also cannot address climate change and food security without considering land-use policies. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has reported that agriculture not only provides livelihoods to more than half of the world’s poorest people, but also accounts for 14% of the world’s greenhouse-gas emissions; while land-use change, such as forest loss, contributes 19%. Half of these agricultural emissions and 80 % of land-use change and forestry emissions come from developing countries. Clearing the forests for food growth and land distribution is not an option, as forests are one of the most important elements in preserving the environment. In fact, Nepal needs to actively restore some of its lost forest vegetation.

Scientific reports increasingly relate climate change with health issues: a study by the Global Humanitarian Forum estimated last month that climate change kills 315,000 and seriously 325 million people every year. By 2030, the number of people killed could rise to 500,000 and 10% of the world's population could be affected. Countries like Nepal will be among the hardest hit.

Sources of energy are, of course, crucial to development, but burning fossil fuels and firewood have disastrous long-term effects on the environment, and large hydropower projects have ecological implications, too. This is an intergenerational problem that requires consistent and cohesive intergenerational solutions. So, how does Nepal move ahead? The country could either take the traditional path that prioritises development over other concerns, such as the environment: the prevailing view among the political leadership. Or we could transition to sustainable development.

Sustainable development is a path that ensures all development activities cause the least amount of harm to our environment, and includes the responsibilities of mitigating, and adapting to, climate change. But this is a cause that Nepal cannot work towards on its own; developing countries must help Nepal.

In the build-up to the Copenhagen climate-change conference in December, a proposal submitted by Mexico has picked up steam. Mexico argues for the establishment of a “green fund”, designed specifically to help countries like Nepal develop in a sustainable way, not only by providing money, but also with much-needed technical expertise. Such programmes will have global repercussions, and can help Nepal to set an example among industrialising countries by taking an alternative development path.

The environment must be made a crucial part of current policy-making conversations; simply adding a few environmental policies is not enough. Policy-makers must understand the importance of implementation. With the constitution as the legal framework, Nepal must work towards a sustainable socio-economic development agenda. Climate change is an intergenerational problem and Nepal’s constitution is an intergenerational guideline. Nepal must not fail to draft a constitution that addresses the most pressing problem of the coming decades. Domestically, Nepal requires a renewed and urgent understanding of the relationship between social justice, development and environmental sustainability. Multilaterally, Nepal needs an unflinching commitment of help to address climate change from countries that contributed the most to creating the problem. The international community must press Nepal to deliver on its goals in a sustainable manner; and it is their fundamental duty to support the country in that process.

Gagan Thapa is a member of the Fundamental Rights Committee of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly

Kashish Das Shresth is director of 350 Nepal

An earlier version of this article was published by the Kathmandu Post on June 5, 2009.

Homepage photo by dul_conte

“Still waters run deep”

Isabel Hilton — Mon, 29 Jun 2009 05:42:00 -0400

Li Xiaolin, CEO of China Power, tells Isabel Hilton why she attended the World Business Summit on Climate Change, and why she wants to encourage a new generation of businesspeople.

Li Xiaolin is the CEO of China Power International Development Limited and a councillor for the Copenhagen Climate Council. chinadialogue editor Isabel Hilton caught up with her at the World Business Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen.

Isabel Hilton (IH): What is the use of the World Business Summit, from a Chinese point-of-view?

Li Xiaolin (LX): I am a councillor for the Copenhagen Climate Council, a group that will convene at the climate-change talks in Copenhagen [in December], at which people from all over the world who are passionate about peace will deliver a proposal. I think that because the world belongs to everyone – if I can carry out some specific actions related to environmental protection, I will be very happy.

At this global business leaders’ meeting, everyone will have the opportunity to see Al Gore, the former US vice-president, and the United Nations secretary-general Ban Ki-moon – who have both come as speakers to this meeting. Today is the last day, and the prime minister of Denmark and I were on a panel together. Entrepreneurs and the leaders of countries from all over the world place a lot of importance on this. I also attended a roundtable meeting with the Danish prime minister, at which there were representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and, of course, China. Everybody sat down together and had the chance to discuss global issues, to create common actions for common goals – and to do things to protect our planet. I think this event was influential in a good and meaningful way.

IH: What were the results of the discussion?

LX: The result was a plan to promote a concerted action for the whole world – but how this plan will be implemented depends on the final proposal that comes from the UN climate talks. By means of appeals and suggestions, we are setting a standard to which every nation must adhere.

IH: China’s economy is very important, but we only see a few Chinese representatives at this meeting. Do you think people in China have a good understanding of the dangers of climate change? Are they aware of this problem? If so, why aren’t they here?

LX: China has changed a lot in these past years. We have seen changes to the economy, and along with economic growth, people’s awareness of environmental protection has started to change, too. You can see that the Chinese government is not only developing the economy, but is also committed to environmental protection. We are promoting the “scientific concept of development”.

As the economy has developed, the Chinese government has placed a lot of importance on protecting the environment. For a number of years, we have formulated many policies and strategies, including a white paper that was an announcement to the whole world that we are not only developing the economy, but also putting practical importance on protecting our shared planet. For example, from 1990 to 2007, our policies toward enterprises meant the reduction of the equivalent of 210 million tonnes of carbon dioxide – a huge figure.

As a businesswoman attending the conference, I bumped into many old friends: some from the government, such as Xie Zhenhua, vice-minister at the National Development and Reform Commission – an expert in this field, some from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and some private entrepreneurs, such as Shi Zhengrong [of Suntech Power Holdings].

I think that Chinese businesspeople will slowly discover these kinds of international meetings, and they will gradually start to attend them. You have a few of us here as representatives already. I want to reiterate that I am devoted to the development of renewable energy. In our office, we have our own business culture, which I refer to with the idiom “still waters run deep”: our generation does not only want to bring light and motivation to the world, but also we want to leave clear water and blue skies for future generations. Because of this, we are implementing clean energy.

IH: Do you think China's successes will inhibit the work of addressing climate-change?

LX: I don’t think this work can be the effort of any one person or one country, because this planet belongs to everyone, and it needs everybody’s contribution. So, today we have started the tasks that we must undertake with diligence. I hope that every person and every country will work hard together and make our planet even more beautiful.

Li Xiaolin is the CEO of China Power International Development Limited

Isabel Hilton is editor of chinadialogue

Homepage photo by Yibinxueyuan

China’s creeping sands

Sean Gallagher — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 08:21:00 -0400

Growing sands are transforming China’s arable land, with nearly 20% of the country’s land area classified as desert. A slideshow by photographer Sean Gallagher documents the issue, which affects the lives of an estimated 400 million people.

Desertification is the gradual transformation of arable and habitable land into desert, normally caused by climate change or the destructive use of land. Each year, desertification and drought account for US$42 billion loss in food productivity worldwide.

It is estimated that nearly 20% of China's land area, some 1.74 million square kilometres, is now classified as desert. Affecting the lives of an estimated 400 million people, it is one of the most important environmental issues in China today.

Riding on China’s “desertification train”, which passes through the country’s driest and hardest-hit provinces – Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu and Xinjiang – Sean Gallagher travelled over 4,000 kilometres to document the environmental challenges along the route.

You can read Sean Gallagher’s dispatches from the field [in English] here

Putting cities at centre stage

Isabel Hilton — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 06:24:00 -0400

The world’s cities can be laboratories of low-carbon innovation and need to be factored into a future climate-change framework, says London’s former deputy mayor. Isabel Hilton interviews Nicky Gavron.

Isabel Hilton (IH): What do you want from the climate-change talks in Copenhagen in December?

Nicky Gavron (NG): For the last seven years, I have led on climate change for London. I am keen that the business community recognises the importance of working with city governments very closely in order to make – and to strengthen – the case for the role of cities in delivering high national targets. City governments have huge responsibilities in relation to this, because most of the energy is consumed in cities, and therefore they are responsible for high carbon emissions.

Cities are very vulnerable, so citizens immediately come to city governments when there are floods and droughts and the sea-level rises. We have huge opportunities – and we want nations to realise that unless they put cities centre stage, they are not really going to be able to deliver what is needed, because cities have the levers. They do need more powers and more resources in order to do that.

IH: Are cities in the Bali road map? Are they acknowledged as agents in this process?

NG: Up to now, cities have not been acknowledged as agents in the process. But in fact, city networks all over the world believe that there can be no post-2012 framework which doesn’t include the role of cities in it, and also recognise that cities – in order to reach the high targets that are needed by nations – will need to be empowered and resourced.

Sometimes that will mean that national governments must unleash the power of cities by removing road blocks and barriers, and in some cases it will mean making a regulatory framework that makes sense for the cities to act. For instance, in London we want to generate at least one-quarter of our carbon dioxide savings from much more efficient locally-generated energy, combined heat and power and microgen – decentralised energy. But in order for us to do that, we want combined heat and power and cooling, and we want to use the heat from generating electricity, which is wasted by big power stations. But we don’t have a heat law. If London was in Denmark, or in the Netherlands, there would be a heat law and that would make it much easier for us. That is an example of where a national framework can make a big difference.

IH: Given that more than half the world’s population now live in cities, how is it that this vast process has got underway without cities being centrally featured?

NG: It’s an international process and I think it is a pretty complex undertaking to get all the nations on board and rowing in the same direction. I think that cities haven’t risen up the agenda for that reason. I have been very involved in the city movement and have realised that everything we were doing in London we have learned mostly from smaller cities, very innovative ones like Copenhagen, Stockholm, Curitiba – a brilliant city in Brazil – Seattle, Portland, Barcelona and so on. Big cities are very difficult to turn around, but they are already responsible for 75% of energy consumption – and about 80% of greenhouse-gas emissions.

Cities are also highly vulnerable – all cities, wherever they are in the world, but some more than others. Twenty of the 30 largest cities in the world, including all the financial centres, are on water and very vulnerable to sea-level rises. The recession really would pale into insignificance compared to what would happen if you had a four-metre sea-level rise. That would be the end of London, even though we have got the best flood defenses in the world. Everything we then rely on, in terms of trade and production and commodities and so on, would be as nothing – it would be destroyed. There really is a huge reason for seeing that cities have the responsibility: they have the motivation and they have massive opportunities.

We did some research in London, looking at per capita how resource-efficient or resource-wasteful we were, and we discovered that on water and energy we were much more resource-efficient – we used less per capita – than citizens outside of London, and also we produced less carbon dioxide in transport than elsewhere. This is because the density of the population and the activity. It shows that cities may be the problem, but they are also a huge part of the solution. Because of their urban form and concentration, they are more efficient in terms of resource management; but how much better could they be if they were given the powers and the resources?

The other thing is that cities drive national economies. Five cities in the United States would make up the fourth-largest economy in the world. Bangkok and San Paolo are about 10% of their countries’ population, which are responsible for about 40% of the GDP. You have a situation where cities anchor their wider metropolitan regions, which really do drive national economies. What we need is for nations to understand that there cannot really be national prosperity in the future without taking cities into account. If you believe – as many of us do now – that there is a massive task and opportunity in terms of aligning economic security with job security, climate security and energy security, then it is going to be the cities that should be centre stage in delivering that.

IH: Is it not up to national governments to empower cities to do this, rather than an international forum? It is already complicated internationally. Can’t national governments ask cities what they can deliver? Or cities ask their national governments to give them the tools to deliver?

NG: In terms of the specificity of what is been asked for, that is right. But in terms of making a general case, I think that has to be done at the international level – and has to be written into the road map and onto the framework. In fact, we would like to go a bit further: we would like the message put across that there can be no post-2012 framework that does not include the pivotal role of cities within it, but at the same time we should say we want you, as nations, to engage and empower and resource those cities. Then we want to get down to more specificity in some of the sub-clauses within the framework agreement – and talk about removing the roadblocks and barriers, giving financial incentives, allowing cities to have bylaws and so on.

IH: Do you want that spelled out?

NG: We want it in the relevant paragraphs. Then it is up to cities themselves to negotiate and put propositions to their own nations. The other thing I think needs to be recognised by all nations is that cities can go further and faster, and therefore they should be allowed to trial national policy – to be laboratories for experimentation and innovation. There are very good examples of this around the world. Look at the way London has pioneered congestion charging. Look at the way Freiberg actually changed the law of the sphere of government above it by having an area of 3,000 passive homes. […] There is also research done by Portland showing how much has been saved – something London has emulated – by the way they have sought to collocate transport with development, to cut down the need for people to take so many journeys, certainly giving them very good alternatives to using their cars, getting them onto their bikes, their feet and the bus.

IH: How cities are designed and laid out has a huge impact.

NG: Yes, and I’m not saying that it is easy. But it’s much easier to integrate all of your environmental infrastructure with your transport and your public realm and your social infrastructure on a greenfield site. This is a big hope for China because they are still building cities. In fact, they are building the equivalent of two Manhattans, in floor space (not population) every year. But when you are talking about taking a city with a massive existing stock of infrastructure and buildings – like London, which was the first industrial, high-carbon mega-city – we have got to give ourselves the task of turning ourselves into a mega sustainable city, which means low carbon. These days, sustainable development must mean low carbon. And the only way we can do that is by learning from the rest of the world.

Nicky Gavron is the former deputy mayor of London and a member of the London Assembly.

Isabel Hilton is editor of chinadialogue.

Homepage photo by Larsz

Turning grey to green

Sun Xiaohua — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 05:43:00 -0400

A recent project helped Chinese city mayors learn valuable lessons in sustainable development, reports Sun Xiaohua.

After every lecture, Chang Yongguan was the first person to ask a question. And he used the short breaks between lectures to talk with the speakers. But Chang is not a university student trying to improve his academic record. He is the deputy head of Dadukou district in Chongqing, one of the most populous cities in southwest China, under the direct jurisdiction of the central government.

The lectures were part of a week-long training session at the National Mayoral Training Centre, organised by Joint US-China Cooperation for Clean Energy (JUCCCE), which gathered 25 mayors in Beijing to discuss how to establish “resource conserving and environmental protecting” cities.

Chang became deputy district head last year after spending around 20 years at Chongqing Environmental Protection Bureau. Along with his record of administrative performance, Chang’s strong background in environmental protection helped with his promotion.

He hoped the training session, which featured lectures from leading experts in China and other countries, would help illuminate his search for solutions to the increasing pressures of an urbanising population and deteriorating natural resources.

One of 12 districts in Chongqing, Dadukou has a population of more than 240,000. This will grow to 450,000 by 2020. According to the eleventh Five-Year Plan, the city will maintain an annual economic growth of 12% from 2006 to 2010. The district is the city's industrial base, with large-scale iron and steel plants. It has long been affected by emissions of sulphur dioxide and other pollutants, resulting in acid rain and health problems for residents, including asthma.

Chang has to seek a balance between maintaining economic growth and ensuring a clean environment for a growing population. His colleagues at the training course face similar problems, whether they are from rich cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, or from poorer areas, such as the provinces of Gansu and Guizhou.

The speedy pace of China’s urbanisation will see some 400 million people move to the cities over the next 15 to 20 years, the equivalent of two New York Cities every year. This is likely to mean constructing 50,000 skyscrapers, 170 new public transport systems and 12 megapolises of 60 million people or more.

Rob Watson, founding chairman of the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) green building rating system, says China's fast urbanisation is a challenge similar to a war, with mayors the “warriors at the frontline of the battlefield.”

This is no exaggeration, as China attempts to support 21% of the world’s population with 7% of its arable land and water, 4% of its oil and 2% of its natural gas.

Qiu Baoxing, China’s vice-minister of housing and urban-rural development, gave the first lecture, which focused on solutions, but also the difficulties that face the orderly urbanisation of China.

“Some mayors have historically made mistakes about common sense in urban planning. For example, reclaiming land from rivers and lakes,” Qiu said. “It really destroys the local ecosystem. It also shows the importance of a mayor updating his or her knowledge about urban planning.”

Zhang Chunxiang, deputy mayor of Xinyang, in Henan province, said: “The lectures, especially those given by the foreign speakers, are very inspiring and helping us broaden our horizons, although importing the ideas into China demands some localisation.”

After listening to lectures by Nicky Gavron, the former deputy mayor of London, and Stephen Hammer, professor at Columbia University, Zhang was inspired but also confused.

“It would be good to integrate energy planning into urban planning, for instance,” said Zhang. “But the lectures made it clear that any high-profile urban plan will require 10 to 20 years to complete. Since Chinese local government officials are subject to reshuffles every four years, there is question of how to ensure the continuity of an urban plan through several cycles of government.”

Some mayors had long-standing misconceptions about energy-saving and environmental protection corrected during the course. For instance, although Chang was an environmental expert, he still discovered he was mistaken to have believed that a central air conditioning system was an energy-saving solution for office buildings.

“It looks like we need to retrofit our office buildings with separate air conditioners, because it is a flexible way to meet varied demand,” he said. “On the weekends or holidays, for instance, no energy will be consumed.”

China’s current Five-Year Plan aims to build a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society, with targets to cut energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% and reduce emissions of major pollutants by 10% from 2006 to 2010.

But mayors do not have detailed guidelines from the central government on how to implement the plan, since the situation varies from city to city. Each mayor must determine a path tailored to the city’s unique situation. This is why the mayors showed such enthusiasm for the course, which also provided an opportunity to talk with leading environmental experts and professionals, and help the transition to a low-carbon future.

Sun Xiaohua is a senior journalist at China Daily.

Homepage photo by kindsir

A natural state of mind

Kate Humble — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 09:39:00 -0400

Is this busy, technological world a happy one? Kate Humble explains why we can improve our state of mind if we log off and spend more time with nature.

[This article first appeared in the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust’s magazine Waterlife and is republished here with permission.]

Our vocabulary has changed so much in recent decades that our grandparents would now wonder what we were talking about. In the 1980s we got stuck in a language of acronyms, full of yuppies, dinkies and nimbyism. By the 1990s we’d become subversive, flipping “wicked” on its head and turning “mobile” from an adjective to a noun.

As we entered the new millennium, we retreated to our computers and started blogging and googling for all we were worth. Busy, busy words for a busy, busy society. Shorthand terms for those short of time. As the pace of our lives has increased, so the rate of our linguistic change has comfortably managed to jog along beside it. And where has this heady hedonism led us? We’ve made up a new phrase for that, too. The credit crunch has the ability to affect all our lives, yet, again, previous generations would have no idea what it meant. Good heavens, most of them weren’t even able to get credit in the first place.

But there’s an answer to it all and, unsurprisingly, a new word to sum it up, too. It’s called ecopsychology, and although the word may be less than 20 years old, the concept it describes is most definitely not. In a nutshell, it means that nature makes you feel good, and if that seems a rather banal and obvious statement, consider how far removed from nature so many of us have become.

In Britain, one survey last year showed that only 53% of children could correctly identify an oak leaf, and nearly one in three had no idea what a magpie looked like. Another asked children to rank their favourite ways of spending their free time: playing in the countryside came bottom.

Add to these statistics the World Health Organisation’s prediction that depression will become the second-biggest cause of ill health by 2020, and you start to wonder whether our decreasing contact with nature and increasing reliance on antidepressants are in some way connected.

It appears that they are. A number of studies around the world have shown that patients in hospital beds where the view through the window is of greenery tend to recover faster than those who look out on more industrial or urban views. Other studies have shown that in many urban environments reports of violence lessen by up to 50% when greater access to nature is built into people’s lives. There are reports of the effect of nature on children’s attention-deficit disorders, and on adults’ irritability levels. Socialisation in a community can be up to 90% higher when green spaces are available than when they are not. Stress levels go down. Crime is reduced. It’s all good stuff.

Let’s be frank. It makes sense, really. As the great Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (WWT) legend Janet Kear once wrote: “Just as you can’t sneeze with your eyes open, you can’t feed a bird from your hand without smiling.”

Meanwhile, simply walking among all that greenery gives us a certain level of exercise, which is good for us, too.

The scientific benefits of nature are increasingly being proven, but there’s an aesthetic aspect, too. The poet William Wordsworth wrote of his daffodils: “For oft, when on my couch I lie/In vacant or in pensive mood,/They flash upon that inward eye/Which is the bliss of solitude;/And then my heart with pleasure fills/And dances with the daffodils.” He did not write of his oxygen intake or his neurobiological system.

Medical science is proving that nature is good for us, and this is an excellent and timely thing. Yet we are human beings, not just machines, and use human judgements to help us make our decisions. A recent poll asked whether respondents would be happy for their doctors to provide outdoor exercise instead of prescription drugs, if they thought it would work. Now, outdoor exercise is more time-consuming and requires more effort than popping a pill, yet 94% said that yes, they would be happy to accept that advice. Could it be that stirring inside us all there’s not just a medical need to spend more time in green spaces, but a spiritual one, too?

This is not about religious domains, but a connection with our natural environment that’s tucked away in our collective psyche. We are natural beings ourselves, yet we’ve transplanted ourselves from the woods and wetlands into brick boxes with tarmac links between them and shimmering screens to occupy our hours. Are we simply yearning for the world that directly gave our ancestors their life and livelihoods?

The biologist and thinker EO Wilson believes that our humanity effectively depends on how we interact with nature. “We are human in good part because of the particular way we affiliate with other organisms,” he wrote. “They offer the challenge and freedom innately sought.” He calls this biophilia, and it basically means love of life.

Compare this with the writings of another man. As he sits at his window looking out, he sees his wife helping his daughter put caterpillars on to fresh poplar branches, and his son drawing a picture of a tree. He contemplates his life in the midst of nature and writes: “I am more than ever convinced that I am the luckiest man I know. I say this not with smugness or self-satisfaction but because I can think of nothing sadder than to live a happy life without recognising it. Maybe I am an ostrich with my head in the sand. Maybe fate or my own or other men’s folly has all kinds of disasters in store for me, but they cannot take away these exciting and happy years. Not to acknowledge such good fortune would be inexcusable.”

This was Sir Peter Scott, the founder of WWT and a man for whom other organisms truly offered that challenge and freedom. He wrote those words in 1960, and they conclude his autobiography The Eye of the Wind. When you’ve lived a life as full of connection with wildlife as Scott’s was, and sum it up by dwelling on happiness, then you truly understand what nature can offer you.

Many have followed in his footsteps at WWT, continuing his work, visiting reserves, offering their services as volunteers and finding ways in which the outdoor life gives them untold pleasure. Those reserves, that work and those levels of happiness await us all.

Ecopsychology and biophilia are good words, but don’t just google them. Come along and find out what they mean in the real world.

Kate Humble is a vice-president of WWT.

[This article first appeared in the Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust’s magazine Waterlife and is republished here with permission.]

Do you feel close to nature? Are too many people too removed from green spaces these days? How much time do you make to simply walk among trees or over hills, or to camp or fish? Do such experiences alter your mental outlook?

Share you thoughts and experiences on the forum.

Homepage image by tricky ™

Tough challenges for China (1)

Pan Jiahua — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 10:32:00 -0400

China’s struggle to save energy and reduce emissions is shaped by the fluctuations of the world economy, writes Pan Jiahua, in the first section of a two-part article.

The financial crisis has spread from the United States to the world. China, as a part of the world economy, has seen a major impact on its economic growth – and its energy-saving and emissions-reduction measures.

Historically, such crises have had a large negative impact on economic development and resulted in reduced energy consumption and pollution. China has set lofty goals for economic development, energy-saving and emissions-reduction; the measures in the eleventh Five-Year Plan have been strictly implemented, though the actual results over the past three years have been unsatisfactory. Although the economy has slowed since August 2008 and energy use has fallen rapidly, with energy-saving and emissions-reduction no longer such a problem, the effect is only temporary. As the economy recovers, both energy use and emissions will rebound. In the long term, economic growth is inevitable and China faces energy-saving and emissions-reduction challenges. China cannot lower its guard.

Since the Industrial Revolution, economic expansion and the burning of fossil fuels have caused massive increases in pollution. But economic cycles and crises cause fluctuations in that economic growth, and hence in energy use and pollution.

The changes in per capita greenhouse-gas emissions for certain nations since the mid-nineteenth century can be seen in Figure 1. Due to the quality of data from the nineteenth century means some historical details are lost, but from the early twentieth century records improve and the data becomes more accurate. Therefore, the data can teach us several lessons.

Figure 1: A historical comparison (1855-2004) of greenhouse-gas emissions per capita in various countries
Source: Pan Jiahua and Zheng Yan (2009)

First, a recession leads to a large fall in energy demand and thus greenhouse-gas emissions. Energy consumption plummeted in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War, with emissions dropping by around 80%. The end of the Soviet Union and collapse of the Russian economy caused energy consumption to drop 40% in 1990. In the “Three Years of Natural Disasters” after the Great Leap Forward in China, energy consumption decreased and emissions fell significantly. Energy crises in 1973 and 1986 also reduced energy demand and emissions in major economies. The Great Depression also saw energy use and emissions fall by one third.

Second, the more globalised a nation is, the greater the impact of a global crisis. Developing nations, which are less integrated into the global economy, suffer less than the early industrialisers, such as the United States and countries in Europe.

Third, although per capita emissions fluctuate with the economy, the overall trend is upwards. When a crisis has passed, emissions quickly rebound and hit new highs.

Fourth, per capita emissions are almost in direct correlation with development. As the level of development increases, so do emissions per head. Europe and the United States have higher per capita emissions than developing nations, such as China and India.

Fifth, when development reaches a certain level, growth in per capita emissions slows, stabilises and even falls. Per capita emissions in Japan and the United Kingdom have been stable for almost two decades, while Germany has seen 30 years of negative growth.

So, why does an economic crisis lead to energy-saving and emissions-reduction? Table 1 illustrates the changes in China’s energy consumption during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Figure 1 shows how China’s per capita emissions peaked in 1997, falling until 2001, when there was a quick recovery. Analysing the data in Table 1 explains why: first, the financial crisis caused a fall in demand for energy. Growth in energy demand fell from 8.3% in 1995, to 4.1% in 1996 and 0.2% in 1997. At its lowest point, total energy demand had fallen by 9.3%, which led to a drop in pollution. Second, looking at energy structures shows that coal, the most polluting source of energy, was hit hardest. Negative growth started in 1997, with a fall of 15.7% by 1999. Cleaner sources of energy – oil, natural gas and hydropower, for instance – were virtually unaffected. Thus energy became cleaner overall, and pollution fell. Third, when market conditions worsened, low-technology, small, inefficient and uncompetitive enterprises failed first; larger, more advanced and more efficient firms were better placed to weather the storm. This lead to an overall increase in energy-efficiency and a reduction in pollution.

Table 1 Growth in energy consumption during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-2000)

	Coal	Oil	Gas	Primary energy	Total energy consumption
1995	8.3%	8.0%	2.2%	9.9%	8.3%
1996	2.8%	9.9%	12.1%	0.3%	4.1%
1997	-3.0%	10.3%	12.7%	2.8%	0.2%
1998	-7.8%	1.1%	2.9%	5.6%	-4.9%
1999	-15.7%	6.5%	8.0%	-2.7%	-9.3%
2000	-5.2%	7.9%	7.9%	9.9%	-0.3%
2001	10.5%	2.5%	11.5%	24.1%	9.4%
2002	19.5%	7.4%	7.7%	6.8

Source: China Energy Data Report 2004, LBNL, ERI/NDRC, 2006.

During a crisis, economic activity shrinks, demand falls and total energy demand follows suit. Thus a cleaner energy structure ensues. However, the demand for energy across different sectors changes in different ways: household consumption may change slightly, but not much, and the service industry is not affected badly. The largest impact is in the manufacturing industry, particularly raw materials and heavy industry. And while household and service sector energy comes largely from oil, natural gas and electricity, industry – particularly heavy industry – tends to rely on cheaper, polluting sources of energy, such as coal. Therefore, during a crisis the total energy demand falls and energy overall becomes cleaner.

NEXT: Can China meet its energy-saving targets?

Pan Jiahua is executive director of the Centre for Urban Development and Environment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Homepage photo by Bert van Dijk

Tough challenges for China (2)

Pan Jiahua — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 06:52:00 -0400

Despite the economic outlook, China should not abandon its commitments to save energy and reduce emissions, argues Pan Jiahua, in the second half of a two-part article.

The toughest targets in China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan relate to energy-saving and emissions-reduction. Rapid economic growth in 2006 and 2007 meant leaps in energy consumption and a rise in pollution levels, but then the financial crisis hit China in the second half of 2008. By the fourth quarter, the declining economy had relieved some of the pressure to reach energy-saving and emissions-reduction targets.

The Five-Year Plan, released in 2006, contains quantifiable and binding targets for energy-saving and emissions-reduction: by 2010, energy consumption per unit of GDP (energy intensity) should have fallen by 20% on 2005 levels; absolute levels of SO2 and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) should have been reduced by 10%. These are tough targets, and there is an ongoing debate as to whether they were set too high.

However, the financial crisis means that energy consumption in China has been hit. Pollution has fallen, much as it did during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. According to the China Electricity Council, the demand for electricity dropped in September 2008: electricity generation fell by 3.4%. That trend continued, with a 4% fall in October. Excluding holiday periods, this was the first drop of its kind since 1999.

The financial crisis also caused China’s energy intensity to fall 4.59% in 2008, while COD and sulphur dioxide emissions fell 4.42% and 5.95% respectively, exceeding annual goals. In the past three years, energy intensity has fallen 10.08%, COD and sulphur dioxide emissions by 6.61% and 8.95% respectively.

The financial crisis has done China a favour, but it will pass – unlike the long-term challenges. In fact, the need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions will only increase.

China’s current targets will now be reached easily, but longer-term aims will not be achieved so readily. Energy-saving and emissions-reduction are not the same as greenhouse-gas curbs. Energy-saving does reduce pollution, but atmospheric pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and particulate matter can be removed using technical fixes – with scrubbers, for example. Greenhouse gases can be captured and stored, but the methods for doing so are not yet commercially viable. Moreover, conventional pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, do not increase much once per capita GDP reaches around US$10,000, but greenhouse-gas emissions are on the increase in countries with a per capita GDP of US$30,000.

Figure 2: Per capita greenhouse-gas emissions and per capita GDP (1960-2004)

Source: Pan Jiahua and Zheng Yan (2009)
X Axis: Per capita carbon dioxide emissions
Y Axis: Per capita GDP (US$ intl2000)
Right-hand key: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Australia, Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, India, China.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between income levels and greenhouse-gas emissions in 14 major economies between 1960 and 2004. Several features can be identified: first, income and emissions are related. Emissions increase sharply when per capita GDP is below US$10,000, but they start to slow over the US$15,000 level. Some nations, such as France and Germany, have seen their greenhouse-gas emissions fall despite increases in income. Greenhouse-gas emissions generally still increase with income, however. Second, countries with similar levels of income can have very different levels of emissions. North American countries and Australia have similar levels of income to European nations and Japan, but twice their greenhouse-gas emissions. On the surface, this appears to be because of differing availability of resources, but it is actually because of differing policy orientations. Europe and Japan emphasise public transport and energy efficiency and levy energy and climate taxes; the cost of fuel in Europe is around twice that of the United States. This shows that different methods of production and lifestyles can have a major impact on emissions. Third, developing nations, such as China and India, still have low incomes and low emissions per capita. Per capita emissions in South Africa, South Korea and Mexico are approaching European levels, despite their lower incomes. Therefore, if developing nations do not move towards low-carbon development, large quantities of greenhouse-gases will be emitted and pose a threat to the global climate. Similarly, developed nations need to reduce emissions and help the developing world to make low-carbon development choices.

Emissions in developed nations are slowing or even falling, while those in developing nations are growing, as incomes increase. So, what does the future hold? The International Energy Agency has calculated actual emissions for major countries from 1990 to 2006, and made predictions for 2030. Emissions in the developed economies have remained almost unchanged, with negative growth in Russia and other transitional economies. But there have been major increases in developing economies – around two-fold over the 16-year period. In China’s case, emissions have increased around 150%. If compulsory emissions reductions are not enforced by 2030, developed nations would maintain emissions at a stable level; emissions would fall in some countries, such as Japan. In contrast, emissions in developing nations will double, with India’s emissions possibly increasing threefold. By 2030, developing nations would account for the majority of emissions, with China potentially matching the combined emissions of the European Union and the United States.

In the long term, the financial crisis will not relieve the pressure on China to reduce emissions. China’s energy comes mainly from coal. Nuclear energy requires major investment and takes time to come onstream. Wind and solar power are not yet commercially competitive. Cleaning up China’s power will be a long and arduous task. Improvements in energy efficiency can mean maintaining the same output for a reduced energy input, but income increases will improve the quality of life, and private vehicles will become more common. These improvements, along with expanding populations, are a major source of increasing emissions for any developing nation. Developed nations have less room to improve quality of life, and they have stable or shrinking populations. In developed countries, cleaner and more efficient energy use will result in absolute falls in emissions, since they have seen stable or slightly falling emissions even without emissions reduction measures.

The economic crisis has taken some of the pressure off China, but only for a short while. China needs to deal with the current crisis, but also to make long-term plans for economic recovery and ongoing development – choosing a low-carbon path with improved energy efficiency and a better energy infrastructure, developing clean energy and preventing greenhouse-gas emissions from becoming a barrier to China’s economic growth.

Pan Jiahua is executive director of the Centre for Urban Development and Environment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Homepage photo by LHOON