The media in India's energetic civil society is central to providing a forum for debate and discussion. Simon Billett discusses what this means for the country’s environmental policies and attitudes.
The Indian response [to climate change] is that of a complex social system and public forum in which nationalistic emotions are deep-set.
As climate change has risen up government and (some) corporate agendas, it has also percolated down into the view of the public. Indeed, public debate about climate change is remarkably intense for a global environmental issue, as these problems are commonly seen as taking place “somewhere else”. Now, as the next round of negotiations gears up to the UN climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009, the role of the public is seen as key, not only to pushing governments to act, but also to drive grassroots action at the doorstep level.
Yet the role of the public in climate debates is clearly not ubiquitous, especially in Asia. More often than not, the western media talk of “China and India” as if they were one and the same, using them as the beacons of the developing and emerging economies’ position in debates about international emissions cuts. However, this presupposed pairing is far from a homogeneous entity, not least on the issue of public participation in the environment. In China’s one-party state the role of a voting public and civil society is starkly different from India’s vibrant-at-best and stalemated-at-worst democratic system, which gives the public, and particularly public opinion, a key role in shaping environmental policy and attitudes. While the dragon’s road to Copenhagen is predictable only so far as the government will reveal, to assess the elephant’s climate policy path we must begin to pay attention to this increasingly important factor in international climate politics: public understanding and debate.
India has an energetic civil society in which the media plays a key role in providing a forum for debate and discussion. The print media—by far the most prolific in a country where access to electronic media is exclusive—is largely private, owned by single families or corporations. These publishing houses have large control over the flow of information and on setting the tone of public debates, not least on climate change. A survey by the Global Nielsen Survey in 2007 suggested that 70% of literate Indians use the press as their primary source of information on climate change. The press debate and coverage influence public understanding and perception, and those reading the press influence the government through voting and wider public pressure campaigns, such as the 1,000-strong New Delhi Climate Rally in December 2007.
Over the last six years the Indian press has given increasing attention to climate change, a turnaround after a long period since the 1980s during which the issue was largely dismissed in the country. Historically, the Indian government and press had followed the line captured by Indira Gandhi’s statement in 1972 that “the environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty”. Indian delegations at summits have continually argued that, in the words of one official, “had the emissions of the developed world been that of the developing world, the world would not face the threat of climate change”.
Since 2002, however, the Indian press has begun to pay increasing attention to climate politics, with coverage increasing by 280% between 2002 and 2005. Unlike in the United States or some European countries, the coverage of climate change as a scientific phenomenon has been unanimously unquestioning. Rapid and dangerous climatic change is reported in impressive scientific detail, often quoting specific reports from academic journals to inform readers about the plight ahead. There is a close focus on the environmental threats from climate change, particularly that which may occur in India specifically: 75% of the articles on climate change between 2002 and mid-2007 suggested that India was “under threat” from climate change. Moreover, the press focus on these threats was centred on the impacts to Indian people themselves, rather than impacts on industry or absolute growth. Two-thirds of the 75% of articles were concerned with either monsoonal change, Himalayan glacial retreat or falling crop yields. There appears to be a suggestion among the newspapers that climate change will bring catastrophic environmental change to India and that the people on the ground will suffer.
This climate of fear over global warming fuels public representations of climate politics. In this context of threats and potential humanitarian disaster, discussion over what should be done about climate change is largely focused around who is responsible for it. The answer, according to the press, is found in the past. Of press articles between 2002 and June 2007, 76.3% argued that the developed world was responsible for climate change, and by extension, as defined by the press, for the threats to India. A typical article in the Times of India argued that citizens in the “north are primarily responsible… through excessive resource consumption… intended to support their lifestyles”. When it comes to climate policy the Indian press have a clear argument: climate change is not caused by but threatens India. Accordingly, the discussion over possible action on climate change was focused on two options: either the “north” acts to mitigate global climate change, or the “north” pays for mitigation efforts globally. Like Wheeler, Ummel and Kraft’s Another Inconvenient Truth, published in June on chinadialogue,the press argue that “developing countries cannot allow their economies to suffer on account of a problem caused by the [north]”.
The story is similar for adaptation. Almost all of the 29% of articles that suggested that the environmental threat warrants essential adaptation in India argued that that it should be bankrolled by the developed world through financial transfer mechanisms. In addition to their scepticism over international action, the press were highly critical of the lack of any major adaptation fund prior to the UN climate talks in Bali. They argued that the lack of adaptation action was evidence of how all alliances with the north only favour what is beneficial to it—in this case, mitigation rather than adaptation.
Indeed, much of the press’ discussion of climate change is conducted in starkly postcolonial terms: “north and south”, “developed and developing”, “us and them”. Like many national mass media outlets, the Indian press give a national tint to climate discussions. Toward the United States’ climate position, for example, the press are overwhelmingly (82%) negative, arguing that developed states are blocking action on climate change, and, in turn, are further damaging India through a lack of action to mitigate the threats outlined by the press. Toward other developing and emerging economies, in contrast, discussion is wholly empathetic (100%). A kind of southern solidarity is created, with the climate “pit[ting] India, China and Pakistan against the developed world”. This postcolonial rhetoric reincarnates climate change as a kind of “carbon colonialism”, to use the phrase of the prominent New Delhi NGO Centre for Science and Environment. International issues like climate change are still seen very much in north-south terms, akin to those outlined by president Nehru in post-independence India. An elephant never forgets, it seems.
When we think of the Chinese response or the Indian response, then, we are thinking not only about different states but also about different concepts of society: autonomous government and dynamic civil society. And this is significant. The Indian response is that of a complex social system and public forum in which nationalistic emotions over climate change are deep-set. Climate change is seen as an extension of former north-south exploitation and, as one journalist put it, of the “north not cleaning up its mess”.
As we enter the run-up to the talks in Poznan, Poland, in December, and then to the Copenhagen negotiations, China and India will be asked again to put aside their resentment towards the west on international climate policy. While the Chinese government may be able to negotiate and deal, India does not forget easily and holds the country in a historically-focused position. What remains to be seen is whether the elephant will ever forget—or if it should.
Simon Billett is a Masters student at the University of Oxford. This article is based around forthcoming research conducted in India in 2007. For further information please contact simon.billett@chch.oxon.org .
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我很奇怪,这篇文章究竟要暗示什么。难道是印度的媒体自由与活跃的公民社会事实上对印度人民的利益及在短、中、长期上对世界总体有害?不正是公民社会的活跃性与媒体自由,让如同这位作者一样的人们能够在印度,并以一种在中国不可能做到的方式表达意见吗?某种程度上,我在某种程度上更喜欢看上去稍显混乱的海德公园的演讲角,而不是干净卫生的新加坡城市公园。
本评论由Ming Li翻译
I am curious what this post is really suggesting. Does it mean that India's media freedom and vibrant civil society is in fact detrimental to the interest of the Indian people and to the world at large in short, medium or longer term? Wouldn't the very vibrancy of the civil society and media freedom allow voices like this author's be heard seriously considered in India in a way impossible in China? I somehow would prefer the chaos and discussion of the Speaker's Corner at Hyde Park than a sanitized and clean Singapore city square.
“当我们想到中国的反应或印度的反应时,我们想到的不仅是两个不同的国家,还想到了两个不同的社会概念:自治政府和活跃的市民社会。这很重要。印度对气候变化的反应出自其复杂的社会系统和公众论坛,并带有根深蒂固的民族主义情绪。印度人将气候变化看成是以前北对南剥削的延伸,正如一位记者所指出:‘北方没有清理好他们留下的混乱局面。’”
我虽然不能指出有哪个具体研究对两国的民族主义情绪进行了严谨与清晰的比较,但我以为,那种以为自己是受害者的想法,在中国要比印度有市场得多。
本评论由Ming Li翻译
"When we think of the Chinese response or the Indian response, then, we are thinking not only about different states but also about different concepts of society: autonomous government and dynamic civil society. And this is significant. The Indian response is that of a complex social system and public forum in which nationalistic emotions over climate change are deep-set. Climate change is seen as an extension of former north-south exploitation and, as one journalist put it, of the “north not cleaning up its mess”."
Although I cannot point to any specific study that has explicitly compared the nationalistic emotions of the two countries with sufficient rigour, I would think that the victimhood idea in China is much stronger than in India.
作者说的很对。看一看中国同日本的关系,可以将之同印度和英国目前的关系做比较。大多数印度人都已经释怀过去,面向未来了,而中国政府仍然让人民继续旧日的仇日情绪。这样,独裁的政府就可以塑造一个普遍接受的外部敌人,从而转移人民对内部的不满情绪。约翰
You are absolutely right. Look at China's relations with Japan and compare it with India's current relations with the UK. Most Indians have moved on with their lives but the Chinese government has maintained old victimhood ideas to linger in the minds of its people. Afterall it helps an authoritarian government to have a common external enemy to divert internal dissent.
John
政府已经做了很多事情深化中日友好交往。而仍然存在的仇日情绪与中国国民持旧思维不放的顽固保守心态有关。我个人看到的更多的例子来自于祖辈和父辈对年轻一代的家庭教育的影响。
Chinese government has tried to build a friendly relation with Japan. The existing anti-Japanese emotion is related to an obstinate mentality of Chinese who fail to let go of the old thought. This can be found in many cases in the education that younger generation get from their parents and grandparents these days.
Translated by Ming Li
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