感谢何凯乐,这是一篇很好的关于中国国家气候变化报告及1980年以来经济发展历史的介绍。2000年之际中国向重工业的转型及快速的城市化进程标志着中国进入了工业化的第二阶段。随着各公司内部，特别是中小型公司，做出的商业决定越来越多，中国对能源的需求越来越大，能源密集性产品（钢铁，铝，水泥等）的生产正是国内以及全球市场需求的结果。也许在你的文章里没有详细提到这一点，但是我感觉你的文章认为重工业转型以及高能源消耗的原因在于中国内部。很抱歉我对你的文章这么挑剔。

然而我同意你的观点，中国必须建立节能性社会，并在应对气候变化中扮演更积极的角色。重要的不是中国能多快进入如今全球重工业化及城市化的阶段，而是中国应如与国际社会更积极地合作，共同在传统的发展模式中减少对碳的依赖，否则10到20年后非洲将重蹈中国的覆辙。说到中国经济的能源强度，我有一个比较技术的问题，即你使用的指标是什么？我核查了国际能源机构（IEA）的数据。数据显示：2004年中国每创造价值1000美元的GDP需消耗0.94石油当量吨,而日本、经合组织及印度分别为0.11, 0.20和0.99；而依据GDP购买力平价，中国、日本、经合组织和印度分别是0.23, 0.16, 0.19和0.18。使用GDP或是GDP购买力平价来衡量可另当别论，但是两种方法下我都不认为中国经济的能源强度是印度的3倍。也许更合适的比较方法是比较某个特定产业每单位能源消耗的实际能源产品的产出（比如，实际生产钢铁和水泥的吨数）。你能否告诉我你文章所使用的数据？王韬---廷道尔气候变化研究中心和苏塞克斯能源研究小组

A good introduction of China’s National Assessment Report on Climate Change and economic history since 1980s, thanks Karl! The transition to heavy industries around the turn of millennium and quick urbanisation earmarked entrance to the second phase of China’s industrialisation. As business decisions are more and more made within enterprises, especially for small and medium enterprises, China’s soaring demand on energy and energy intensive infrastructures (for steel, aluminium, cement, power etc) is largely driven by its own domestic demand, but also by the globalised market. Maybe you didn’t mention this explicitly in your article but the transition to heavy industry and high energy consumption sounds like just an endogenous change to me when reading your description. Sorry for being picky. But I agree with you that China has to build an energy-efficient society and be more active in combating climate change. The critical issue is not how fast China can get the current phase of heavy industrialisation and urbanisation, but China needs work more proactively with international community to reduce carbon reliance in conventional development path, otherwise Africa will just be another China in 10-20 years time.

Regarding to energy intensity of Chinese economy, I have a more technical question, which indicator you are using? I checked the data from International Energy Agency (IEA), which says in 2004, China used 0.94 teo (Tonne of oil equivalent) for every thousand US$ (in year 2000 value) GDP produced, the figures for Japan, OECD and India are 0.11, 0.20 and 0.99; when using GDP PPP (purchasing power parity), the figures for China, Japan, OECD and India are 0.23, 0.16, 0.19 and 0.18. While either using GDP or GDP PPP is another technical debate, I didn’t see Chinese economy has energy intensity 3 times higher than India in either case. Maybe a more comparable way is to compare specific sectors by using physical outcomes per energy consumption (e.g. how many tonnes of steel or cement produced). Can you tell me which data you are using in your article?

王韬 (Tao WANG)
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research & Sussex Energy Group

你提出了一个非常有意思的问题，即：天气预报的可靠性。这尚是一门比较新兴的科学，所以我想只有当灾难真正来临的时候我们才知道预报是否可靠。但是我不确定我是否想等到那一天的来临。我想我们要接受科学家们提出的这种可能性，同时意识到科学是在不断发展的。但是我们研究的是一个非常复杂的全球系统，所以它不可能是很直接地体现出来的。如果怀疑灾难可能发生，我们就应该未雨稠缪：如果科学家们的预测有一半可能性是正确的，情况就很严重。如果明天你的房子有50%的可能性会被烧毁，你得做点什么来挽救它。如果灾难性气候变化的发生有50%的可能性（我认为可能性更高），难道我们不应该做力所能及的事来避免吗？

You raise an interesting question about the reliability of climate forecasting. It is a relativel new science so I guess we shall only know with absolute certainty how reliable it is once the disaster has happened. I am not sure I want to wait. I think that we have to accept probability as our guide for much of the forecasting, as the scientists acknowledge, whilst also acknowledging that the science is improving all the time. But we are looking at complex global systems so we cannot expect it to be straightforward. If there is doubt we should take the side of caution: if the sceintists are only half right, the situation is very serious. If there was only a 50 per cent chance that your house would burn down tomorrow, you would do something about it. If there is a 50 per cent chance (and I believe it is much higher) of catastrophic limate change, shouldn't we be doing all we can to avoid it?

非常感谢韬对于我的中国能源和气候间关系的文章发表了评论。可以说，该评论是非常复杂的。同时我也很高兴你质疑我引用的能源强度的数据。做为一个社会科学家，我没有对我引用的数据进行计算。我所引用的整个能源强度信息都出自于今年早些时候“中外对话”刊登的国家环保总局副局长潘岳的文章，但是类似的数据均值得怀疑。实际上我一般不喜欢引用数据，而是试图对问题进行定性分析——这是因为众所周知从中国方面获取的数据并不可靠。我个人关于能源强度数据的主要论证是，如果中国人民币贬值，这将意味着中国的能源强度比表面看起来乐观很多。事实上世界银行目前正对中国宏观经济数据进行再评估，所以很快我们就可以再审视我们的数据和研究模式了。何凯乐---斯德哥尔摩环境研究所

Thanks Tao for your kind words about my attempt to paint a short history of Chinas energy and climate relations, which are, to say the least, very complex.

I am happy also that you put in question the energy intensity figures. As a social scientist I have not calculated any of the numbers or figures that I present. Overall energy inensity I have quoted from vice Minister Pan Yue's article on China Dialogue earlier this year, but similar figurs are in swing all over. In fact I generally do not like to use number but try rather to portray problems in qualitative terms -- this because of the notoriously shaky data material that one can draw on from China. My own main argument against the energy intensity numbers is that if the Chinse yuan is undervalued it would consequently imply that energy intensity is much better than what it appears. In fact the World Bank is presently reviewing Chinese makroeconomic data so we will soon have to recalculate our figures and modells.

Karl Hallding,
Stockholm Environment Institute

谢谢何凯乐的解释。我同意你的观点，低估的人民币会让中国的能源强度数据看起来比实际更令人沮丧。不过，中国在增加能源效率仍然有很大的潜力，这里不仅仅是指那些大公司，更多的是指在那些规模小而且效率低下的小公司中。以钢铁行业为例，2006年中国最大的9家钢铁集团只生产了总产量的30％多一点。事实上，在我最近和一位中国环保总局高级官员的交谈中，他认为中国的能源效率，尤其是在国有大型企业中，由于在近年的新增产能中大量应用新技术已经提高了很多。我想中国造成高能源强度的原因一方面有低估的人民币的原因，另一方面也是由于存在大量规模小而且效率低下的企业。如何在这些分布广泛的低能效小企业中实现向低碳转型才是中国转向低碳经济的关键。王韬

Thanks Karl for your clarification. You are right that an undervalued Chinese yuan could give an even gloomy picture of China’s energy intensity. Nevertheless, China still has large potential to increase its energy efficiency, not just in the large companies, but more in the inefficient and small scale companies. Take steel as an example; in 2006 the largest 9 companies only produced little more than 30% of total production.

In fact, from my recent talk with one senior officer in Chinese SEPA, he suggested that China’s energy efficiency has been improved a lot due to the use of new technology in the recent capacity expansion, especially in the large state own enterprises. I think the reason of China’s high energy intensity may come from the factors of both undervalued Chinese yuan and large number of small inefficient enterprises. How to make the low carbon transition take place within the widely spread small and inefficient enterprises will be a key to China’s transition to low carbon economy.

(Tao WANG)
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research & Sussex Energy Group

我非常同意本文中提出的所有想法和意见，这真是在理智上的一大迈进!
中国的能源效率近几年的确提高了。在2006年,中国已经开始着手于像'1000强企业'的方案，也就是在中国的大企业中提高能源效率，同时淘汰小型,低效能的发电厂，其中包括'到2010年2亿5千万吨过期水泥能力'（刘易斯， 2007 ）。

中国的水泥工业，消耗了约5 ％的商业能源，但同时也是一个提高效益的典范。但是用这种举措来调整该国的工业结构以提高其能源效率是不尽合理的.这是因为，它意味着中国将重点放在由新的大型/高效但排放更多温室气体的电厂来取代小型/低效的电厂上。事实上，中国每十天就在建设一个新的燃煤发电厂！这种规模上不平衡的现象实在令人咂舌，究其原因，还是煤炭。

煤炭既是挑战,也是我们未来的能源。清洁煤的成本是非常昂贵的。推行一项减少和消除煤的污染（储存而非排放二氧化碳)的政策要消耗30-40 ％的能源。从中国的角度来看，在这项技术上的投资对财政上带来不了什么收益，因为中国希望从煤炭加工中尽可能地获取高能源，但如果需要花费很大能耗使之成为清洁能源，那么中国经济将如何发展？中国蛙跳式发展究竟能走多远？

所以这里探讨的就是技术成本问题。而且煤的价格低廉，储量丰富也是很诱人的。虽然中国政府正在推动清洁电力，然而洁净燃料在中国并没有得到充分利用，因为它们的成本是很昂贵的。当煤炭的替代品如石油和天然气用完时，煤炭的储量仍将很丰富。假设中国的能效能达百分之百，中国仍将极有可能继续使用煤。

杰西卡 马西亚斯 博沙泰南 安普敦大学，英国。

I appreciate all these thoughts and ideas, what are great way to intellectually move forward!

It is true that China’s energy efficiency has improved in recent years. China has embarked on programmes like ‘Top 1000 Enterprises’ in 2006, to improve energy efficiency in China’s largest enterprises and eliminating small, inefficient power plants, including ‘250 million tonnes in outdated cement capacity by 2010’ (Lewis, 2007). China's cement industry, which consumes about 5% of all commercial energy, is also a good example of efficiency gains.

However such action to adjust the country’s industrial structure is not entirely plausible in terms of increasing its energy efficiency. This is because it means that China is focusing on replacing small/inefficient to new large/efficient power plants that emit larger GHGs. In fact, China is building a new coal-fired power station every ten days! The magnitude of that imbalance is staggering and the reason for this is coal. Coal is the challenge and the energy of our future.

And leaning coal is very costly. Pursuing a policy of reducing and sequestering coal (burying CO2 rather than emitting it) would take 30-40% of energy. From the Chinese perspective, there is little financial incentive to invest in such technology because China wants as much energy from processing coal, and if it takes much energy to clean it, how does this develop the Chinese economy? How far will leapfrogging take China? The question to pursue here is therefore on technology cost. Coal's low price and its abundance have been such powerful incentive, too. Although Chinese authorities are pushing for cleaner power, clean alternatives in China aren't fully utilized because they are expensive. When alternatives like oil and gas will run out, coal will remain abundant. Suppose China had 100% of efficiency in terms of intensity, China will most likely continue to use coal.

Jessica Macias Bochatay
University of Southampton, UK.