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A new approach at Copenhagen (1)

To classify a nation as “developing” or “developed” is insufficient to decide its climate-change responsibilities. In the first segment of a three-part essay for chinadialogue, leading economist Hu Angang explains the alternative.

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[Produced in association with Rutgers Climate and Social Policy Initiative]

The current classification of nations as either developed or developing does not reflect reality and is preventing agreement on an emissions reduction scheme that is acceptable to all nations. This article, which will be published in three parts, proposes two new principles to be used for classification during emissions reduction processes. First, nations should be assigned to one of four categories according to their Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, rather than classed as simply developed or developing. Second, major greenhouse-gas producers should be made to bear greater responsibility for emissions reduction. These principles can help produce binding targets for emissions reductions worldwide. The paper then calculates the emissions reductions China should make, and proposes a “road map” for use within China, based on provincial net carbon sources and HDI figures. The paper holds that an emissions reduction commitment by China will help promote a global consensus on climate change.

A new classification

The future of humanity is at stake. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December is our last chance to save the planet, and there is the possibility of failure. If emissions targets and responsibilities are not set, we will all suffer the consequences -- and China is no exception. The world’s most populous nation, and one of its geographically largest, is environmentally vulnerable. China could benefit most from global public goods, but it also has the most to lose from climate change.

Despite living in an ever-closer global village, international organisations and domestic politicians have failed to find a plan they can agree on. Differing national demands and interests mean consensus is elusive. But as the Copenhagen meeting approaches, the chances of failure rise – and failure there will be a failure for humanity. 

Identifying a universally acceptable international climate-change policy and emissions reduction proposal before Copenhagen is essential. This scheme will need to redefine developing and developed nations and establish a dynamic framework within which future obligations will be set. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) divides nations into two types, developed or developing, with different policies for each. But this is a very crude categorisation. Defining developed nations is relatively clear: for example, we can take the countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). But over 100 nations are described as “developing”. Emissions reduction obligations fall on the shoulders of a small number of developed nations; this is of no benefit for cutting global emissions. Meanwhile, the lack of action from developing nations gives some developed countries a pretext to refuse to reduce their own emissions.  

Therefore, we must recategorise countries by taking into account average greenhouse-gas emissions per capita, total greenhouse-gas emissions, historical and current responsibilities. We can use efficient and equitable principles to place each of the roughly 200 countries of the world into new categories, replacing the binary distinction of developed or developing. This will determine the emissions reduction contribution of major polluters in terms of their contribution to global emissions. To this end, this article has two proposals.

First, the binary distinction should be replaced according to the HDI, an index between 0 and 1 that ranks countries by their levels of development. I propose dividing countries into High HDI (above 0.8), Medium-high HDI (0.65 to 0.8), Medium-low HDI (0.5 to 0.65) and Low HDI (less than 0.5). The planet is thus divided into four sections.

The High HDI group contains 70 countries, with a total population of 1.6 billion. These nations would make major, non-conditional emissions cuts, as specified by the UN. Over time this group will expand. According to the Human Development Report 2005, published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), there were 57 nations in this group in 2003, with a total population of 1.21 billion, 19.2% of the global population. An increasing number of nations will become non-conditional emissions reducers.

The Medium-high HDI group (of which China is now a member) has a population of 2.44 billion, 37.41% of the world total. These nations would be second-tier emissions reducers: conditional reducers. Targets would be set according to the gap between the nation’s HDI figure and the 0.8 threshold; the smaller the distance, the greater the obligation. When the country enters the High HDI group, they become non-conditional reducers. In the case of China, the country's HDI in 2005 was 0.777. In 2010, it will reach 0.8, and China will then become a non-conditional reducer of greenhouse-gas emissions. A UN agency to monitor the actions and achievements of these two groups should be established.

The Medium-low and Low groups would not be obliged to reduce emissions, but voluntary reductions should be encouraged where possible.

Second, we must require greater emissions cuts from the biggest polluters. Currently the world’s 20 largest emitters account for 75% of total emissions. As the largest emitters, they should be the biggest reducers. And the greater their proportion of total emissions, the larger contribution they should make. Reduction quotas will be apportioned according to the negative externalities caused by global pollution: those with the highest emissions will bear a larger responsibility for reductions, and have higher targets to meet. Those 20 nations are headed by China and the United States, who account for 38.14% of global emissions. They are followed by Russia, India and Japan, each accounting for at least 4% of global emissions, and a total of 14.23%. A third group made up of the remaining 15 countries accounts for 22.89% of total emissions. Obligations will change in line with these proportions, and HDI figures will also be factored in. Fourteen of those countries are in the High HDI group, the non-conditional reducers of emissions. Five are in the Medium-high group, the conditional reducers. India alone falls into the Medium-low group, but as a major carbon polluter it should actively reduce its emissions. As it moves into the Medium-high group it will become one of the conditional reducers.

This HDI-based system could also be used to determine financing structures. High HDI nations would be major contributors of funds and technology; Low HDI countries would receive direct development assistance and free or low-cost technological assistance; Low-medium HDI nations would benefit from low-interest loans from international financial organisations and low-cost technological assistance; High-medium HDI countries would receive technological assistance. As the UNDP publishes HDI figures every year for all countries, they represent a simple and transparent basis for a global emissions reductions and the disbursement of economic aid.

These principles can be used to set binding targets. A nation’s emissions reduction targets will be determined by its stage of development, including its total emissions, average emissions per head and historical responsibilities. HDI is an excellent measure and should be used instead of GDP. Goals are also determined by contribution to overall historical and ongoing emissions. The 20 largest emitters have a direct impact on global targets and action, so their reduction targets and actual emissions will be linked. It is feasible to use these principles at the Copenhagen conference to determine a road map for emissions reductions by all nations until 2050, determining their obligations under a global emissions reduction agreement.

TOMORROW: Can China cut its greenhouse-gas emissions?


Hu Angang is one of China’s best-known economists. He is professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University and the director of the Centre for China Study, a leading policy think-tank. Hu has worked as the chief editor for China Studies Report, a circulated reference for senior officials.

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匿名 | Anonymous

国家利益至上的选择

我认为胡教授的观点的确有些问题,而问题的关键就是那位谈判代表所提到的,胡教授作为一名“国情专家”,怎么能无私到无视国家利益至上这一基本底线。
发达国家定性中国是“新兴国家”,其要旨并非承认新兴国家与其相仿的国际地位,而是要求这些国家更多的承担本应由其承担的国际责任。体现在应对气候变化的国际碳外交中,就是要在“共同但有区别的责任”原则无法改变的情况下,将所谓“新兴国家”贴上“非发展中国家”的标签,迫使这些国家在经济发展尚不强大的时候过早的限制排放,在这些国家根本不能保障资金和技术能够充分发展低碳经济的时候,遏制这些国家的进步速度。
由于中国这样的新兴大国在崛起的阶段对土地、资源、市场、和平环境等的需求非常强烈,特别渴望有广阔的发展空间。使得以“发展中国家”身份参与国际事务在中国外交政策中一直占据着核心地位。
正是这一矛盾促使国际谈判迟迟不能取得成果。发达国家有他们的理由,美国的退出是因为不让中国减排对美国不公平,欧盟的强势是因为欧盟认为中国应当成为“负责任的大国”,但是,发达国家的万千理由,实质就是为了本国的国家利益,不惜牺牲中国的发展速度。
在发达国家的智囊和学者为其国家出谋划策、鼓噪呐喊的时候。中国的确缺乏维护、捍卫本国国家利益的声音。甚至有人认为:一个国家应对气候变化的责任不应仅仅取决于“发展中”还是“发达”国家的判别。胡鞍钢教授就提出了所谓“创新”的全球减排的国家分类原则。然而这样的创新目的只有一个,就是让中国通过承诺减排义务推动全球减排协议的达成。从中国国家利益的角度考虑,这样的制度创新只是发达国家一贯主张的旧瓶里装上的新酒而已。
基于上述判断,胡教授的观点似乎真的矫枉过正了,也似乎有离经叛道的意思。其实,气候谈判始终是政治问题,政治意愿和国家行动更多取决于各国经济发展状况。因此,中国的碳外交必须充分重视本国的经济发展模式和形势,在摸清家底的同时,积极寻求与欧盟和美国等主要国家和国家联盟的沟通,并在当前全球经济的波动对气候谈判提出了更大的挑战的宏观背景下,促使放缓的世界经济反过来推动僵化的国际机制,在世界各国刺激经济的同时,对内推进低碳经济转型的发展,对外则坚持“发展中国家”身份,尝试有条件自愿减排的制度设计。在国家利益最大化的基础上,为中国碳外交寻找谈判筹码和突破口。
最后,我认为,幼稚的学术研究不但没有价值,而且会因为其信马由缰的创新思路给中国的碳外交带来实际的损害。
评论人是华东政法大学国际法学博士研究生李威,研究方向为国际环境法和法律经济学。[email protected],欢迎交流。

The choice for maximizing national interest

I think Professor Hu’s opinion really has some problems, and the crux of this problem is the one mentioned by the negotiating representative. As an "expert in Chinese Studies" how can Prof. Hu take an unbiased look and disregard the national interest, a basic starting point?

Developed countries have defined China as an “up and coming country.” And their purpose is not to admit that up and coming countries have the relevant international status. Instead they demand that these up and coming countries should assume even more responsibility than they are. In the current international carbon trade diplomatic response to climate change, under the unchanging principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” these so-called “up and coming countries” are labeled as “non developed countries,” which forces these nations that are still not economically strong to prematurely impose restrictions on emissions. Putting restrictions on emissions for these countries when they cannot safeguard basic necessities such as funds and technology to develop a low carbon economy hinders the rate of their progress.

Since China is this rising power that has just emerged, it has strong needs for soil, resources, cities and peaceful environment. China especially desires a wide space in which to develop. Therefore it is core in foreign diplomacy that China participates in international affairs as a“developing country”.

It is this exact contradiction that produces an inability to achieve results in international negotiations. Developed countries have their reasons, too. The United States withdrew because it is unfair for them to cut emissions without China's action. The EU’s might came from its belief that China should become a “big responsible country.” But beneath all the developed countries’ all kinds of reasons, the essence is the original country’s national interest, through which these developed countries do not hesitate to sacrifice China’s rate of development.

When scholars and think tanks from developed countries give advice to their own countries, people complain that China lacks safeguards; it does not have a voice to protect its national interest. There are even people who think that a country’s responsibility to respond to climate change does not depend on the distinction of whether it is a developing or a developed country. Professor Hu Angang suggested a so-called “innovative” global reduction of emissions classification principle. However this type of new view has only one principle, which is that China, through adopting the duty of reducing emissions, pushes the whole world to reach an agreement on reducing emissions. Considering it from the perspective of China’s national interest, this kind of institutional innovation is just the developed country’s old wine in a new bottle.

Due to the points mentioned above, Prof. Hu’s opinion seems to be overcompensating, and also seems to have a rebellious tone. Actually, climate negotiation is political all the time. Political aspirations and national actions depend on the structure and situation of each country’s economic development. For this reason China’s carbon diplomacy needs to fully attach importance to its own economic mode and its circumstances, at the same time, knowing the clear situation of itself, and actively looking for communications between alliances of the principle nations such as the European Union and the US. In the unfavorable background of the current fluctuating global economy, China particularly needs to induce the slowdown of global economy to push up the rigid global mechanisms. As every country strives for economic stimulation at the same time, domestic policy needs to advance to transform and develop a low carbon economy, while foreign policy needs to remain committed to the dignity of developing countries, and to try to push plans that call for voluntary conditions to reduce emissions. On the foundation of maximizing the national interest, China needs to look for negotiation bargaining chips and breakthroughs for its carbon diplomacy.

Finally I believe that naïve scientific studies not only are worthless but also damaging to China’s carbon diplomacy by thinking it is the one that holds the reins.

The commentator is Li Wei, a PhD student at the International Law School at East China University of Political Science and Law, who majors in international environmental law and economic law. [email protected], communication is welcome.

(Translated by Michelle Deeter)

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

一种新的思路

这总比我们万年不变的共同但有区别的责任原则好。

A new way of thinking

At least, it is much better than the responsibilities and principles we used for tens of thousands of years with only a little bit of changes.
(Translated by Jing Jiang)

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

国家利益到底是什么

谈判的基础当然就是国家利益,只不过对国家利益不同的人,不同的利益代表有不同的看法。比如小布什就反对克林顿总统积极支持的京都议定书,所以美国成为世界的气候变化的公敌。但是,奥巴马总统是积极的看待哥本哈根的会议的,他希望能达成全球的一致。你看,就这十几年时间,美国的利益或者利益的取向是在变化的,每个人都有每个人的道理,每个人都认为自己是在维护国家的利益,那么这个利益到底是什么,就是个人为的课题了,是不是?
问题是,奥巴马一个人说了不算,还有国会。我相信,国会肯定会把中国和印度扯进来,作为达成妥协的交换。
在目前我们国家对气候变化的认识以及研究还很肤浅的情况下,我们不大可能争取我们的利益最大化。说实在的,这个国家利益,不管是短期的还是长期的,到底是多大的规模,就怕没有人仔细研究过。
这是个挑战,也是个机会,胡教授起了个头,算是好头吧。但是,我觉得这个反应了一个严重的问题。胡教授既然想发言,想就这个问题说说话,想必做了些调查,不可能就是口说无凭,乱说。我把他的提议看作是气候变化的全球缩影,或者说是减排量分配方法的探讨,没有触及到根本,还是比较原始的阶段。
我觉得需要深入探讨的倒是,这个减排对于我们国家不同的地区,行业,产业以及城市和乡村,我们到底在哪会得,在哪会失,和我们发展经济的努力到底关系怎样?需要量化,而不是说教。就是说让数据说话。换句话说,我们说来说去,也没有指出我们现在应该做什么。总是停留在发展中国家的定位,这个我看不会让世界吃惊,我们既然不能提出什么建设性意见,我们就在会议里不痛不痒的批评别人,就像联合国安理会一样,我们有否决权但是基本不用,更多是弃权。做评论家既安全又不费力,符合我们中庸的一贯政策。

What exactly is the national interest?

Of course, 'national interest' forms the basis of diplomatic negotiations. The snag is that different people or different interest groups all have different ideas on what this actually means. For example, when George W. Bush decided to oppose the Kyoto protocol to which his predecessor Clinton had been so enthusiastically committed, the US became the common enemy in the fight against climate change. But now, President Obama is once more heavily involved in trying to hammer out a global consensus at the Copenhagen conference. Thus we see that American interests, or at least their orientation, have been in a state of flux for the past ten years. Everyone acts according to their own individual reasoning, and yet they all believe themselves to be working in the cause of protecting national interests. When it comes actually to trying to define 'national interest', aren't we always going to run up against this question of individual perspective?

The problem is that whatever Obama says, he still needs Congressional support. I think it highly likely that Congress will insist on put both China and India as a precondition for any compromise.

Given the fact that our country's knowledge and research into climate change is still at a fairly superficial stage, it's unlikely that we'll be in much of a position to maximise our own interests on this matter. In fact, there has been far too little in the way of detailed research on the nature of this particular
'national interest' in both its short and long-term longtime; we don't even know what kind of scale it will ultimately occupy.

But though this presents a challenge, perhaps it presents opportunity as well. Professor Hu has made a start, and a good one at that. However, I think that underlying this is quite a serious problem. Since Hu is so eager to have his say on the issue, he must presumably have done a bit of research (it's hard to believe he would simply be mouthing off with no basis). Nevertheless, I think his proposal is fairly stereotypical of prevailing global attitudes towards climate change, which is to say that it is limiting itself to investigating methods for assigning emissions reduction quotas, and misses the fundamental problem. What's more, it's still at a fairly primitive stage.

I think the question that really needs exploring in depth is the specific effect that emissions reduction will have on China's various regions, industries, cities and villages. Where will we benefit; where will we lose out; how will it eventually impact on all the hard work we've put into developing our economy? We need quantitative assessments, not dogma; let the figures speak for themselves.
Stuck as we are in our position as a developing nation, it will come as no surprise to the rest of the world that since we remain incapable of coming up with constructive suggestions, our role at the conference will be limited to superficial criticism of others. It's just like our behaviour in the UN security council - we have the right to a veto, but we scarcely ever use it, and make do with abstaining instead. Being this kind of critic means that we don't waste any effort or risk sticking our neck out, something entirely in keeping with all the rest of our mediocre policies.

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匿名 | Anonymous

以己之私废天下大公

我觉得所谓减排谈判不过是又一个政治、外交、经济角力的舞台,所谓国家利益不过是“个人自扫门前雪,莫管他人瓦上霜”的现代国家层面的翻版,没看到有任何国家、任何个人(或许我没有亲眼见到,亲耳听到)以全人类的命运为使命,为最终关怀而倡导减排。这里有些的所谓专家不过是以己之私废天下大公的庸人而已。-杨宾,中国辽宁

self-concern

I think that negotiations on emissions reductions are just another stage for politics, diplomacy and economy. For modern states, national interest only amounts to “Sweeping the snow from your own doorstep regardless of the frost on neighbour's roof". I have not seen of any country, nor any person (personally, with my own eyes, or heard with my own ears), calling for emissions reductions in order to save the fate of all mankind as their ultimate concern. All you here are a few so-called expert,s who are motivated by their own concerns.
Yang Bin, Liaoning, China.
(Translated by Yu Liangjie)

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匿名 | Anonymous

持保留意见的赞成

胡教授提出用HDI来划分减排责任,可行性值得商榷。不过,哥本哈根能救划分责任的方法达成一致,肯定是好事。对于中国来说,用高于GDP的指标来划分减排责任,其实对中国是有利的。yfy

Agreed, but with reservations

Professor Hu has suggested we use HDI as a basis for apportioning responsibility for emissions reduction, and I think it's certainly worth looking into the feasibility of this proposal. However, the important thing at Copenhagen is that some kind of consensus is reached, whatever the eventual methods used. From China's perspective, using targets above GDP to distribute emissions reduction goals may actually end up being beneficial.

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匿名 | Anonymous

将中国也分四个区

如果按照胡老师的理论,中国也应该分4个区,有条件的多减,没条件的少减,像北京,上海这样的大城市,HDI高的地方,多减排,西部穷地方,少减排,中国的总量还是会高的,信不信由你。

Divide China into four parts

According to Mr hu's theory,China also should be divided into four parts.Those parts with good conditions reduce more emission than those with bad conditions.Big cities with high HDI,Like Beijing,Shanghai,should reduce more emission.The other way round,poor areas in the west reduce less emission than those above.However, the total number will be still be high.Believe it or not.

本评论由陈丽英翻译

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

关于中国国情

读过胡教授的几篇文章,但感想和6楼的帖子相同。虽然我不是谈判专家,但依然认为胡教授的观点和中国国情有些脱轨。
按照胡教授的理论,中国似乎很快就应该向世界承诺碳排放了,但这在现阶段对中国是不切实际的---中国还有许多基础设施没有建成,人民很多基本需求没有满足;发展经济需要碳排放!中国应该在恰当的时机做出对世界负责同时也对中国人民负责的承诺--那必然是真正满足可持续发展,同时可以实现的承诺。这个时机不是现在。
我很尊敬的一位教授(中国代表团成员)曾说,他现在努力在国际谈判中让中国不承诺,是为了中国承诺的那一天尽早到来。无比赞同!

Regarding the situation in China

I've read Professor Hu's articles, and I have to say I agree with post No. 6. Though I'm not a negotiations expert, I still feel that there's a disparity between the professor's position and China's actual situation. According to his logic, China should apparently be wasting no time in accepting a cut in its carbon emissions, but this is unrealistic for China at the current stage. China is still in the process of trying to build up its basic infrastructure, and many of its people are unabble to satisfy even their most fundamental needs. Economic development means carbon emissions! When the time comes, China will meet the full requirements of sustainable development, thus fulfilling its obligation both to the world and to its own people. But that time has not yet come. A certain professor (and member of the Chinese delegation) for whom I have a large amount of respect for once said that the reason he was devoting so much effort over the course of negotiations to avoid China's having to accept any responsibility now, was to ensure that China would be better placed to accept its full burden as soon as possible. Couldn't agree more!

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

对23号评论的评论

因为23号评论的周先生针对国家利益是什么与我进行了邮件交流,现回应如下:

国家利益其实的确是个比较虚无的东西,特别是当国家还不能给他的国民太多民生和民权的时候。但是具体到气候谈判的问题,国与国之间就是国家利益的博弈,而我们都有自己的祖国!

气候谈判的后果将直接影响每个国民的生活。可能你知道,美国的Waxman-Markey Draft 正在国会审议,其中有将要对来自那些未按其标准减排CO2的国家的产品征税碳关税。且不说美国在国际环境协定之外自搞一套的对国际环境法的无视,这样的行为也是贸易保护主义对WTO多边纪律的违背!对主要依靠出口美国获得些许外贸盈余的中国出口商来说,是美国金融危机对人们信心打击之后又一次以应对气候变化而减排GHG的名义实施的对中国的又一次剪羊毛。你看,这里面不是没有国家利益吧,而这之后恐怕就是公民利益或者不同国家的老百姓的利益了。我之所以不同意胡老师的意见,是因为国情专家不懂得国情而作的研究很可能无意间充当了博弈对方的垫脚石。

Comments on Number 23

Because Mr Zhou (number 23) and I exchanged our opinions on national interests through e-mails, I have responded as follows:
National interests are really non-existent, especially when the country in question doesn't render much democracy and livelihood to its nationals. But when it comes to climate change negotiations specifically, the relation between nations is a trail of nation interests and we all have our own countries. The results of this negotiation will have a direct impact on the lives of every national. Maybe you known that the American Waxman-Markey Draft is currently making its way through Congress. It states that products from those countries that don't curb their emissions of CO2 according to American standards will have duties imposed upon them. It doesn’t say anything about how America is always ignoring International Environmental Law beyond international environment agreement, which goes against the multilateral discipline of the WTO as well.
For Chinese exporters who achieve a spot of surplus through exporting to the US, the US takes advantage again, aiming at China in the name of curbing emissions of GHG to deal with climate change after the American financial crisis has crushed people's confidence.

You can see there is no nation interests involved here, however I'm afraid there will be implications to citizens and the interests of common people to follow. The reason why I disagree with Mr Hu's ideas is that specialists on national conditions carry out research but at the same time knowing little of nation conditions and it is more than likely that they will unwittingly become stepping-stones for the other side in chess playing.

Translated by Chen Liying (Anna).

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匿名 | Anonymous

我所认识的谈判代表们

我不知道发言的是哪位谈判代表,不过,估计胡教授这回是得罪了整个谈判代表群体,因为,他们舌战群雄为的就是“共同但有区别的责任”原则,在他们眼里国家利益是至高无上的(因为工作的关系,我认识他们中的一些人)。我是气候变化阴谋论的赞同者,一些国家希望用气候变化这个看似很高尚的问题限制我们的发展,希望我们尽早承诺承担减排义务,而胡教授的观点恰恰为这些国家提供了新的方案。按照胡教授的观点,我们应该做2010年无条件减排,这比某些国家希望我们承诺的时间还早,中国的谈判代表们不生气才怪!

The negotiators I know

I have no idea who is the negotiating representative that addressed, but I reckon that the entire group of negotiators (China) are displeased with Professor Hu’s argument this time, since the main point they are arguing with all the others from the world is the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, and nations’ interests mean everything to them, as far as they are concerned (due to the nature of my work, I know some of them). I am a climate change conspiracy theorist. In order to limit our country’s development, some countries are using climate change, a seemingly high-minded issue, in the hopes that China will promise to take responsibility of reducing carbon emissions as soon as possible, and Professor Hu’s opinion just provides a new proposition to these countries. According to him, China should reduce emissions unconditionally by 2010, which is even earlier than the supposed timetable some countries hope we can promise. No wonder Chinese delegates feel angry.

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匿名 | Anonymous

对23号评论的评论 (2)

你看,你同意胡老师的建议,是因为美国和欧洲许多研究人员已经提出过这样的论调,只是表述有些许差异而已,基本上符合气候谈判中发达世界对中国的要价和期许。其技术性很强的提法可能也符合您美国能源工程师协会注册能源管理师项目的身份要求。而我不同意,可能就是因为我们背后的国家不一样,我想您是美国公民吧?胡老师的方案已经触及到了根本,也就是要否定“共同但有区别原则”。气候问题的确是全球问题,需要全球国家鼎力合作,但是发达国家口惠而实不至的作为实在是不能让我们认同。发达世界指望我们不要发展了,因为气候在变化!指望我们不要再走西方国家的老路了,因为全球在变暖,指望我们不要开汽车,因为污染空气,指望我们不要坐飞机,因为它排放巨大,指望我们把工厂都停掉,因为他们是排放的凶手,指望用中国环境威胁论来抵消中国的发展速度,因为中国发展了对你们是个威胁。

您是美国能源工程师协会注册能源管理师项目中国小组副主任,您在和我商榷国家利益是什么的时候,也希望推广您的培训项目,我说的对吧?和大量的气候基金一样,您参与中国的与碳有关的项目,只是为了您和您的机构经济利益吧?我觉得你说服不了我,因为我们知道你的观点背后的利益驱动是什么?你看,那些投资基金利用CDM从中国低价买走排放权,通过二级市场交易获利巨大。现在发达国家还需要我们建立国内的碳交易市场,以方便私人机构利用碳减排的名义赚取投机利润。

我们不是没有建议,只是没有话语权。国家参与气候谈判的确没有太丰富的智囊支持,以至于我们的声音很弱。但是我们有自己的原则。国内不同的地区,行业,产业以及城市和乡村的发展方式和速度都不同,而中国得失的关键就是在国际气候谈判中是否被量化减排指标。这里就是有国家利益的问题存在。我关注它,是因为这里背后还有更多的中国老百姓的发展权、发达权的问题。作为一个公民,我希望国家不要苟同那些表面光鲜,实质是圈套的制度设计,那背后往往是对中国国家、中国公民发展权的剥夺。

Comments on No.23

You see, you agree with Mr Hu because researchers from America and European countries have already put forward such a view, with only a few differences. Basically this view accords with the conditions and expectations that developing countries require of China. Maybe these technological proposals come from demands made by certified energy managers of the American Association of Energy Engineers. But I disagree with it. Probably it's because we come from different countries. I imagine you are an American citizen? Mr Hu's plan has touched the basis,that is to deny the "common but differentiated responsibility" principles. Climate change is indeed a global problem, and we need the cooperation between countries around the world. But developed countries are merely paying lip service to it, which we cannot agree with. Developing countries expect us not to develop anymore,because the climate is changing. They expect us not to follow the same route as the Western countries, because of global warming. They expect us not to drive cars, because it pollutes the environment. They expect us not to take airplanes, because of its immense emissions.They expect us to close down factories because they are emission murderers. They attempted to use the 'China Threat Theory' to offset China's rate of development, which is also a threat to you.

You are the chairman in the China Certified Energy Manager Project run by the American Association of Energy Engineers. When you are discussing national interests with me, you are also thinking of promoting your training programmes, am I right? Like many climate foundations, you participate in Chinese programme related to carbon just for the economical interests of you and your organisation, right? I don't think you can persuade me because we can see what motives are behind your opinions. You see those funds take emissions rights bought at a low price from China under the CDM program, and make a huge profit by creating a second market place. Now developing countries are requiring us to build our carbon trade markets so that private organisations can make profits off of speculation in the name of reducing carbon emissions. It is not we have no suggestions ,but we have no right to speak. There were not abundant think tanks to back our countries during the climate negotiations,so our voice was very weak. But we have our own principles. Due to different developing methods and rates between regions, trades, industries, as well as between cities and rural areas, the key of gain and loss lies in whether the emission reduction targets are quantified. There exists a problem of national interests here. I pay attention to it because there are even more problems involved,like the right of the Chinese people to development and prosperity. As a citizen, I hope our country doesn't agree with a seemingly attractively designed system design that is, in essence, a trap. It deprives Chinese citizens of the right to develop.

Translated by Chen Liying(Anna)