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China may cap-and-trade before US

Alexander Ochs

Haibing Ma

Readinch

While the US Senate has backed off on climate legislation, China is considering launching emissions-trading programmes within five years, write Alexander Ochs and Haibing Ma.

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Just when leaders in the United States Senate admitted to abandoning their plan of issuing a federal climate bill by the end of this year, top Chinese officials were discussing how to launch carbon-trading programmes under their country's next (12th) Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).

Serving as China's overarching social and economic guidance, Five-Year Plans consistently lay out the most crucial development strategies for this giant emerging economy. Once included in the plan, carbon trading will be viewed as part of China's national goals and will be domestically binding. This occurred most recently with the country's 2010 energy-intensity target, which called for a 20% reduction from 2005 levels and was disaggregated into provincial and local targets, with local officials held accountable for achieving them.

In short, China seems to be accelerating full-throttle toward a low-carbon economy.

Chinese policymakers have been eyeing a domestic emission-trading scheme for a while. In August 2009, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) deputy director Xie Zhenhua announced that China would launch a pilot carbon-trading programme in selected regions and/or sectors -- basically the same message now discussed for the Five-Year Plan. On one hand, this reiteration demonstrates that the Chinese government is seriously considering such a market-based mitigation mechanism; on the other hand, the fact that the programme's status is still in discussion one year later shows that putting cap-and-trade into action might be not be so easy in China either.

Here are some of the problems: A non-voluntary emission-trading system cannot work without a mandatory cap on emissions, either for the economy as a whole or for individual sectors. However, China is currently unlikely to set an absolute emission target because this would contradict its long-standing position at international climate negotiations that industrialised countries have a historic responsibility to take the lead in this area. Most Chinese climate officials and experts agree that China could probably peak its emissions between 2030 and 2035, but huge uncertainties remain.

Moreover, with the current US emissions reduction commitment unsatisfactory to most developing countries, China won't change its position unless the United States changes its own position first. Unless significant efforts are made on the US end (through a commitment to a more stringent emission reduction target), China will stick to the emission-intensity target announced in November 2009 as its international commitment.

In addition, a well-functioning emission-trading system would require sophisticated monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) mechanisms. The Chinese government has been making progress in building MRV capacities, but it still lacks transparency in terms of what has been done and how.

Take, for example, the government's regularly reported energy-intensity data. Not only have annual reduction figures been subject to change in sequential publications -- the 2006 number has already been "corrected" three times -- but the reporting procedure has made it difficult to track and verify the underlying calculations. The National Statistic Bureau's annual report on energy-intensity reduction, for instance, reveals only the intensity figure, without showing the deflator used to produce the 2005 base-level GDP, making it impossible to check the pace of the reduction using publicised energy consumption and GDP data. In short, published statistical reports show government numbers but do not reveal how they were calculated.

Finally, a feasible cap-and-trade design would have to consider many details, such as which sectors are covered by the cap, how emission allowances will be distributed, whether there will be price corridors, etc. These design features touch on powerful economic interests. In China, this means that the actual design of the scheme will not be publicised unless the interests of all parties are subtly balanced.

Pilot trading programmes in selected regions and/or sectors may help to mature the mechanism while minimising the scale of negative impacts, such as job losses in inefficient factories. Already, several local governments have taken initiatives to establish voluntary trading schemes.

Thus far, most existing Chinese stock exchanges have focused on broad environmental equities such as environmental technologies and emissions of conventional pollutants: companies with new pollution-control technologies can sell them on the exchange, with sulfur-dioxide (SO2) emission allowances being the major tradable pollution equity. Now, many markets are preparing for the introduction of carbon-dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse-gas emissions trading. For instance, the Tianjin Climate Exchange is expected to launch a carbon-trading scheme by the end of 2010, and Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, has submitted to the NDRC an application to be the first "National Pilot Centre for Carbon Trading”.

Although detailed information is lacking for these initiatives, they demonstrate the government's serious efforts, at the national as well as provincial and local levels, to try to bring the trading mechanism into reality.

Even if these efforts are successful, the international community needs to keep in mind that China would adopt such a carbon-trading scheme strictly in its own interest -- that is, to reduce local air pollution, increase energy security and gain a competitive advantage in the energy markets of the future. In the United States, new energy entrepreneurs have mentioned the same self-interest motivation, as demonstrated recently at the Clean Energy Ministerial Stakeholder meeting (click here to view major US stakeholders' presentations).

However, with a stronger market signal now unlikely for many years because of the delay in comprehensive national climate and energy legislation, the United States might well fall behind China in this new era of global competition over green technologies and services.

It is rather unlikely that China's pilot carbon-trading schemes will lead to an economy-wide emission cap in the near future (they might lead to sectoral national schemes first and an economy-wide cap later). Meanwhile, several other market-based mitigation options are under serious consideration in China. In a 2009 report, the Ministry of Finance's Research Centre for Fiscal Science (RCFS) proposed introducing a carbon tax in the next five years.

While China likely won't commit to a single mandatory national mitigation mechanism anytime soon, it will be interesting to see how the economic and political interests play out during the coming months and years.

Alexander Ochs is director of the climate and energy programme at the Worldwatch Institute and Haibing Ma is the China programme manager with Worldwatch. They can be reached at [email protected].

This article originally appeared on the Worldwatch Institute blog ReVolt.

Homepage photo from the municipal government of Tianjin. The Tianjin Climate Exchange is expected to launch a carbon-trading scheme by the end of this year. Emissions from shipping and aviation are not covered by the Kyoto Protocol.
 

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自愿交易

我觉得中国的碳交易还是会经历自愿到强制的步骤。发改委刚刚明确反对疯狂上马地方碳交易所就是一个信号。http://www.emca.cn/bg/hyxw/qt/20100820041716.html

voluntary trade

I think that China will experience the steps of voluntary carbon trading leading to obligatory carbon trading. The NDRC's apparent objection to madly launching local carbon exchanges is a sign.


收获了政治声誉,但丢掉了关键所在

文中,作者(或者他所在的机构)断言,通过建立碳交易机制,中国正在全力打造一个低碳经济体。然而这样说,他没有认识到一个明显的事实:碳交易并不能减少碳排放。
世界头号碳排放大国必须马上并且大量地减少其碳排放。不论是碳交易机制,还是REDD计划,都太复杂,而不能达到减碳的目的,却会导致其被滥用(正如碳交易证实的)当然,对于提倡这两项计划的人,他们自己都是有利可图的。

Missing the point by gaining political "brownie points"

By asserting that China is "accelerating full-throttle to a low carbon economy" by seeking to establish a carbon trading scheme, the authors (and presumably their institution) fail to recognise that carbon trading obviously does not reduce emissions.

The world's leading carbon emitting countries must greatly and urgently reduce their emissions.

Neither REDD not carbon trading do not seek to do this. They are far too complicated to even achieve what they set out to do - which (as demonstrated by the CDM) leads to abuse. They are of course lucrative to those who promote them...


中国和美国

中国领先美国的东西很多:我们的人多、火车快、政府决策快、房子贵、污染多、骗子多,简直数不胜数。美国政府还在那儿费尽口舌辩论不休,我们早就完成了关停落后产能的2000多家存在或者根本不存在的内地高能耗工厂了,这简直是美国人做梦都不敢想的事情。但是,尽管这样,又如何呢?这个交易,那个交易,搞到后来都是幕后交易,股票不就是个典型的例子吗?更何况这个谁也看不见、摸不着的什么排放量了,真搞了起来,不知道会变成什么样子呢!当然了,少不了发了财的达人,也许还在美国上市,赚外汇呢。

China and US

China takes the lead over the US in many things: we have a larger population, faster trains, faster decisions made by the government, more expensive houses, more pollution, more swindlers, the list is almost endless. While the U.S. government is wasting their breath with constant debates, China, has already shut down more than 2,000 energy-intensive factories with low production capacity that existed or never existed in the mainland, which is inconceivable, even in the dreams of Americans. But so what? We trade here and there, and in the end it is all done behind the scenes; Isn't the stock market a classic example? Moreover, nobody knows the amount emissions, who knows what would happen if it was really done. Of course we can't forget about the rich people, maybe they will be listed on the U.S. market and make foreign currency.

this commet is translated by Dong Hebing


碳排放交易

中国的燃煤发电厂已经策划出一些方案,凭借此他们可以从那些已经关闭的工厂收买环境许可来获得营业执照。但是他们被善于应变且有魄力的环保部门拒绝了。

Carbon Emission swaps

Chinese coal-fired power plants already have schemes whereby they 'buy' environmental licences from plant which has recently shut in order to obtain licences to operate, refused to them by the Environment Ministry - very adaptable and enterprising.


2005 基准

这篇文章写得很客观,很不错。中国根本上需要从管理、税收、(排放)上限以及交易中进行抉择。实际上,中国很有可能在一段时间内选择它们所有。

感谢你指出了2005基准和模糊地数学问题。中国发表言论时从不泄露背后的一些数字,这就是为什么他们认为国际MRV(监督、报道、核实)会“侵害了他们的主权”。

2005 baseline

a very well written, balanced article. basically china needs to choose between regulation, tax, and cap and trade. in reality, it will probably pursue a combination of those three for a while.

thank you for pointing out the 2005 baseline and fuzzy math. china never releases the numbers behind what they say which is why they think international MRV would be an "infringement on their sovereignty"


监测核查的简易方法

监测、报道和核查机制处于“上流”-换句话说就是把监管工作放到化石燃料的卖家而非买家-时,事情就简单得多了。要求煤炭、天然气和石油卖家购买规定每年贩卖燃料数量的上限许可证是较易办到的,因为卖家数量少,而买家则动辄上百万人次。燃料价格随着许可证的销出而上升,从管理上体现了其稀缺资源特性。这对于人也该一样推行,帮助他们调整。这就称为上限与股份或上限与利息。

An easy way to monitor and verify

Monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms are much simpler when schemes are "upstream" - in other words imposed on sellers of fossil fuels rather than buyers. We should require sellers of coal, gas and oil to buy a capped number of permits for the greenhouse gas content of the yearly amount of fuel they sell. That's easy because there are very few sellers but millions of users and uses. The money raised when the permits are sold is a rent arising because of an administratively created scarcity. This should go equally to the people to help them adjust. This is called cap-and-share or cap-and-dividend.


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