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On the Mekong, a better way (3)

Concluding his article on hydropower in south-west China, Qin Hui argues there is opportunity in friction. China must learn lessons from its regional dealings – and then apply them at home.

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As well as plenty of finger-pointing, this year has seen positive developments in the regional conversation over the Mekong. In the run-up to the April meeting of the Mekong River Commission, a collaborative body founded by Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, and at which China and Burma have observer status, China made a welcome gesture of cooperation. It said it would: provide hydrology data from the Manwan and Jinghong reservoirs; consider downstream interests when planning development of the river; and be willing to discuss matters with those affected by such development.

These are all good signs, but I still think China could be more open. For example, why is it handing over data on only the two smaller reservoirs and not the key Xiaowan reservoir, which is 10 times bigger and able to affect river flow over a number of years? It would at least be consistent if China – on grounds of sovereignty – refused to provide any data at all (not, of course, that I’m suggesting it do that). But to provide data on only the smaller reservoirs will only make others wonder what is going on elsewhere. And if further criticism forces China to provide the extra information, then it will appear to be on the back foot.

Could China not be more proactive? After all, the reservoir does not have a lid and there are any number of satellites that could monitor its water levels. And if, as some have speculated, China’s critics have “received support from western, anti-China forces”, it would be a small step for the west to hand over that data to countries on the Mekong. If they aren’t receiving that data, then the speculation is unfounded. Why doesn’t China just hand it over and avoid unnecessary suspicion?

On my visits to south-east Asia, I encountered misunderstandings about China’s actions among the general public. For example, I heard complaints about this or that consequence of the “eight reservoirs” China has built on the Lancang – even though the country has so far only constructed four of the eight it eventually plans to develop.

However, most of the complaints I heard focused not on what China is doing, but on its refusal to communicate, which leaves these communities in the dark. They say China’s authorities are only willing to deal with governments, and not NGOs or the public, and that attempts to obtain information from Chinese embassies and companies are rebuffed. Western nations do better in this respect: many western companies operating in the region actively invite NGOs and the media to visit their construction sites and ask questions. Contacts in Chinese firms tell me western firms are good at winning over those NGOs and media organisations.

One person specifically mentioned two dams located near to each other in Laos. The Chinese-built dam is guarded by the military, and no visitors are allowed. The western-built dam, meanwhile, is open to NGOs and the media and has a constant stream of visitors. He might have sneered at the western method, but you can imagine which the local people prefer.

The Mekong River Commission is an important channel for official contacts, and with support from the United Nations and other international actors, it is highly influential. But when the body was founded in the 1990s, relations between China and many of the participants had not yet normalised, and so China was not invited to participate. This is of course not the country’s fault, but now that friendly relations are in place and China’s development of the river – and the impact downstream – is intensifying, there are hopes that China will take part. The range of competing interests within the body leads many in China to believe it is an inefficient talking-shop, however. And, so as to avoid being held back by the commission, China prefers to remain as an observer only.

As this article makes clear, opinions on how the river should be managed differ from place to place. It is not just a case of China versus downstream nations; the downstream nations themselves have many conflicting interests. No matter how China’s reservoirs are operated, there will be both advantages and disadvantages downstream. We cannot please everyone. But if China unilaterally decides what to do, it may end up failing to win the gratitude of those it helps, while encountering protest by those who are suffering.

If we had the right principles and mechanisms for coordinating multilateral interests and were able to set up the necessary compensation and responsibility systems, things would be different.

As I have said, the demands of Thailand and Laos are completely different from those of Cambodia – but they only complain about China, and not each other. The reason for this, apart from the lack of ability to control the river themselves, is that as all these nations participate in policymaking at the Mekong River Commission. They have a shared responsibility. Whatever the consequences of that policy, nobody can complain that one country is purposely harming another. But China still bears sole responsibility for its actions, so gets no thanks and only criticism. China’s impact on the Mekong is increasing and its participation in a multilateral decision-making mechanism would be of benefit to all involved.

Applying lessons at home

Some foreign observers have blamed the drought in the northern Mekong on China’s “hegemony”, a criticism I have refuted on many occasions. However hydropower operators are behaving outside of China, you can believe it would be even worse at home. Downstream nations may criticise China for ignoring their interests, but I think the energy firms take overseas complaints more seriously than those made domestically, particularly when those complaints come from governments. Complaints from international civil society – the media, mass organisations and NGOs – may not appear to be treated seriously, but the situation is still better than it is in China.

In China there are often conflicts of interest arising from new reservoirs, relocations and changes in water levels; between flood prevention and drought-relief needs and the interests of the hydropower operators themselves; or between development and the environment. There has been fierce debate over the Sanmenxia dam on the Yellow River and the Pubugou dam in Sichuan, for example: should the dam be built? How should it be built? And once built how should it be run? Answering all of these questions requires different interests to be weighed up. Today it seems it is only environmental groups that can speak out against hydropower. But these issues cannot be summed up simply as “environment versus development”, and China still lacks the mechanisms to work through them.

In China today, internal reform and opening up to the outside world are two aspects of the same process. China’s participation in globalisation should provide the country with lessons that it can take and apply at home. In the past I have spoken of the lessons Latin America’s largest Chinese-backed firm, Hierro Peru, learned about dealing with independent unions from its experiences with striking workers and the praise Chinalco earned for respecting local land rights at Aurukun in Australia. This knowledge could help Chinese firms at home improve labour rights and reform compulsory land acquisitions.

Similarly, the Mekong controversy could help our hydropower operators learn how to handle relations with other interested parties. I do not believe this dispute is just an international issue, much less that it is appropriate for China simply to adopt a nationalistic stance in dealing with it.

 

This article was first published in the Economic Observer. It is reproduced here with permission. 

Qin Hui is professor of history at Tsinghua University.

PART ONE: Pulling the wool over critics’ eyes

PART TWO: Attracting unnecessary suspicion

Homepage image from Hudong.com

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eduard

加入湄公河委员会是明智之举。

秦教授并没有认为中国应当完全加入湄公河委员会。然而这样的举措或许将削弱所有国家的电力部门在湄公河计划中的主导地位(包括公司以及官僚的利益)。如他所言,提供小湾以及糯扎渡水库的管理数据或许更具意义——它的调节库容(约100亿立方米)是漫湾和景洪水电站的(2.4亿立方米)四十余倍。然而,湄公河委员会的权力毕竟有限,何况参与国的民主缺乏,使得想要完全表达消费者利益的举措更加步履维艰。

Joining the Mekong Commission makes sense

Prof Qin stops short of saying that China should accept full membership of the Mekong Commission. Such a move might reduce the dominant influence of the electric power sector (both companies and bureaucratic interests) in Mekong river planning in all countries. As he says, it makes more sense to provide data on management of the Xiaowan and future Nuozhadu reservoirs, the regulatory capacity of which (about 10 bn cu.m.) is over 40 times larger than the 240 million cu.m. of Manwan and Jinghong. However, the authority of the Mekong Commission is limited and the lack of democracy in the participating countries makes adequate representation of users' interests difficult.

Default thumb avatar
longp

Long Pham

秦晖教授既替洪森首相和湄公河委员会秘书处的执行官Jeremy Bird先生分析了中国水库对湄公河流域可能产生的影响,也就国际关系的处理方式上向中国政府提供了建议。

虽然2008年在老挝和柬埔寨实际发生的状况仍有待商榷, 但我觉得极有可能是由于云南的水库蓄清排浑而造成毗邻下游的老挝发生水灾而盆地的其他地区则出现旱情。

Long Pham

Long Pham

Professor Qin Hui has given Prime Minister Hun Sen and Mekong River Commission Secretariat Jeremy Bird a lecture on the possible impacts of China reservoirs on the Mekong and the Chinese government the lecture on manner in international relation.

Although questionable as to what had happened at Lao and Cambodia in 2008, I like to point out though that it is quite possible to store water at Yunnan reservoirs and then discharge it rapidly to cause local flood to Lao at the immediately downstream area while elsewhere the basin may be in a drought.

Long Pham

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Default thumb avatar
tvd5551

我们需要合作与信息透明。

我同意秦晖教授的观点。中国政府若是对下游国家持续隐瞒信息,那将会给自己带来更多的麻烦而非好处。即便情况是中方未妥善地运作这些水电站,那也应当与其他国家分享信息并以一个好邻居的身份——正如中国政府所言——共同解决问题。中国在国内环境问题方面的历来记录让人们对其不付诸行动的宣言感到疑惑。

我不会对中国大坝与其下游国家之间的冲突感到焦虑,这乃是水资源发展过程中常见的问题。只要这些冲突的需求能被量化,我们就有可能依靠技术得出最优的解决方案。我们所需要的,其实是沿岸诸国静心而坐,一起分析所有已知数据以及造成的影响,量化所有利益攸关者的需求。为了这一天的到来,中国应当加入湄公河委员会,并给出所有可得到的管理数据。

Cooperation and transparency are needed

I agree with Prof. Qin Hui that it'd make more harm than good to the Chinese authorities if they keep hiding information from the downstream countries. Even in the case the Chinese didn't operate those reservoirs properly, it's still better to share information and work together as a good neighbor as Chinese government always claims. Chinese track record on domestic environmental issues would make everyone suspicious of their claims that have no accompanying action.

I wouldn't worry about competing demands downstream of the Chinese dams, it's always the case in any water resources development. There are techniques to help us achieve the optimal solution as long as those conflicting demands can be quantified. What we need for the riparian countries is to sit down to analyze the available data, the impacts, and quantify all the needs from each stake holder. To start China should join the MRC and make all operational data available.