中国与世界,环境危机大家谈

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Talking tactics

Angel Hsu

Zhao Yupu

Readinch

China’s performance in Cancún points to a new, more conciliatory climate diplomacy from a country that knows the sharp end of the blame game, write Angel Hsu and Zhao Yupu.

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Last month’s UN-led climate talks in Cancún, Mexico, were largely touted as a success, as countries reached near consensus on critical issues such as technology transfer and the creation of a new Green Climate Fund to help developing countries adapt to global warming. The standing ovation for the Mexican hosts that erupted in the summit’s final plenary session came in stark contrast to the conclusion of last year’s Copenhagen talks, which ended behind doors, closed to civil-society observers.

Another marked change in Cancún was China’s tone and communication strategy, following heavy criticism at, and after, Copenhagen.

Whether the finger-pointing was valid or not, Copenhagen was a watershed event for China. In the run-up to the summit, Beijing put forth a voluntary commitment to reduce carbon intensity by 40% to 45% by 2020, compared to 2005 levels, breaking with precedent of avoiding specific emission targets. By making this pledge, as well as by recognising that it would not be first in line to receive financial assistance from developed countries for adaptation and mitigation measures, China stepped into a leadership role. Despite these efforts, the country’s relative lack of experience in climate diplomacy meant it still walked away as Copenhagen’s scapegoat.

China was surprised by the emphasis on MRV [measurement, reporting, and verification of emissions reductions] in Copenhagen and the negative media attention it received, since it felt like it had brought a lot to the table by agreeing to reduce its carbon intensity and taking significant steps to improve energy efficiency and renewables,” said Alvin Lin, China climate and energy policy director at US environmental group the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Transparency of emissions data has been a key sticking point for the United States in climate negotiations. In Copenhagen, US delegates, including secretary of state Hillary Clinton and senator John Kerry, insisted that major emerging economies like China and India must be transparent about their emissions information before the United States would enact climate legislation and provide climate aid. Backed into a corner, China reluctantly agreed to international consultation and analysis (ICA) of its climate pledges – a less stringent version of MRV required of developed countries.

And so one lesson China took from Copenhagen was that it needed to improve its climate diplomacy and revamp its image, if it was to avoid shouldering further blame – particularly if the Cancún talks “failed”. The government started by releasing domestic media accounts that portrayed China’s role in Copenhagen as positive and constructive. Then, in October, China hosted its first UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in Tianjin. The intersessional meeting in the lead-up to Cancún was a prime opportunity for China to showcase itself and reaffirm commitment to the UNFCCC process. But, while Tianjin provided Chinese media and NGOs with ample training ground, eyes were really turned to Cancún, waiting to see how China would respond after the previous year’s public-relations fiasco.

How did China’s strategy change in Mexico? First, it stepped out of the limelight, assuming a much lower profile than it had in Copenhagen. In Denmark, China joined other countries in setting up a pavilion in the Bella Convention Centre, where experts gave lectures and senior members of the negotiation team held daily press conferences. But amongst Cancún’s pavilions – including stands from not just the United States and the European Union, but also first-timers like India and Qatar – China’s was notably absent.

Second, the Chinese negotiation team made concerted efforts to speak in much softer tones in Cancún. A New York Times article pointed out that Chinese negotiators avoided mention of the United States by name, instead “obliquely” referring to it as an “Annex I country that is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol”: a far cry from the Sino-US blame game that erupted in Tianjin. The language was so soft that major media organisations started prematurely reporting that the United States and China were close to brokering a deal on MRV, before the two delegations had actually met.

China also took a new approach to communicating its negotiation stance on key issues, particularly on transparency. In Copenhagen, Chinese officials had appeared elusive when they opposed MRV on grounds of violating the country’s national sovereignty. But in the lead-up to Cancún, Chinese officials decided to be forthcoming. An article in chinadialogue quoted Xie Zhenhua, vice minister of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the head of the Chinese delegation, as saying in strong, clear terms that “China will be transparent.”

Chinese civil-society organisations also contributed to efforts to refashion the country’s image in Cancún. A coalition of China-based NGOs was active in organising side events and distributing materials that showcased China’s climate success stories. Student-led initiatives between US and Chinese youth emphasised the need to build trust based on dialogue and mutual understanding. And Chinese and US-based NGOs, taking their cue from the youth collaborators, met and formalised a long-term action plan for cooperative action. Meanwhile, the private Chinese company Broad Air Conditioning demonstrated its sustainable building technologies at an off-site “Chinese pavilion” that was marked on shuttle-bus maps – and even confused by some for an official Chinese government pavilion.

Chinese media organisations also worked hard to portray China positively in Cancún, helped by the negotiation team’s efforts to make themselves available for interviews in the build-up to the conference. The China Daily, for instance, produced two 16-page glossy specials that were distributed during the first and second weeks of the summit, covering various aspects of China’s actions on climate change, such as efforts to promote low-carbon growth in cities, and including commentaries by foreign experts on international collaboration on clean energy.

Li Xing, assistant to the China Daily’s editor in chief, said Cancún was the first time the newspaper had published special climate conference reports: “I was in Copenhagen covering the climate talks last year. During that conference, quite a few papers, including the Financial Times and Japan Times, published special reports.

In contrast, there was very little coming from China, except fliers at the China booth. That is why we thought of making China more understandable to the outside world here at Cancún. It is largely China Daily’s own initiative, but it does fit in with the wider government initiative to make China better understood in the world.”

The process to revamp China’s climate-communication strategy has, however, suffered inevitable growing pains. Several news articles during Cancún’s first week suggested China was still being misunderstood. A Reuters piece created a lot of excitement when it misreported that China had announced willingness to submit its voluntary emission-reduction targets to an internationally binding process – a “game-changing move”, according to many observers. But senior Chinese officials were quick to refute the claims and clarify that China’s position had not changed. 

Huang Huikang, special representative for climate change at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was quoted in the media reports, recognised the gaffe and told a group of young people from China and the United States that there were still translation issues when it came to speaking to foreign media. He pointed to the dual-edged nature of the press: while contributing to transparency and trust-building, it can also sensationalise and report inaccuracies.

China’s nascent climate diplomacy will only prove more critical for China in the build up to the next major climate meeting in Durban, South Africa, a period during which the international climate regime could significantly change for China. As Cancún failed to determine the legal form of the new climate agreements or to resolve what to do when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 – two key questions for China and other major developing countries – China will be faced with a particularly difficult conundrum: to be more conciliatory as in Cancún or to hold ground as in Copenhagen. Then in Durban, the new climate diplomacy of the world’s largest greenhouse-gas emitter may be tested once more.

 

Angel Hsu is a PhD candidate at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and represented the Yale Climate and Energy Institute as a COP-16 Fellow in Cancun. Zhao Yupu is a Master of Environmental Science candidate, also at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.

Homepage image from IISD shows the opening ceremony of the Tianjin climate summit.


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气象之“高铁”在哪儿

气象嘛,我们中国很差。装备差,服务于人民的意识更差。自己都没有搞明白,如何参与世界的气候,还是任人“摆布”而已。实在和我们“大国”之形象不配。

Where is the China's high-speed railway of climate?

As far as the climate goes, we in China are very bad. Our equipment is inferior and our sense of responsibility to the people is weak. We don't even know ourselves how to be involved in global climate issues, and we are at the mercy of others. The facts don't match up to our image as a big country.


此谓何意?

此文对中国在过去几届联合国气候变化大会上外交风格的转变所做的剖析,我很喜欢。但我很好奇,中国在谈判策略上的改变,是否果真如您所言,从风口浪尖退下是为了避免受到更多责难,规避领导角色,退以谋求来自全球各方的共同努力?若是能进一步分析中国外交风格的这种变化趋势究竟有无裨益就更好了。

What Does It Mean?

I liked how the article dissected a shift in China's diplomacy style over the last few UNFCCC meetings, but I wonder if the change in negotiation style by China is, as you said, more about retreating from the limelight in order to receive less flak and less about taking on a leadership role and hoping for a globally productive outcome? ie, it would be good to have a secondary analysis to see if this evolving diplomacy style by China is more (or less?) constructive.


并无迫切感

本文作者,与诸多借由“气候变化”谋生或是沽名钓誉的评论员一样,似乎忘记了一件事,那就是几乎所有的政府都已经接受对温室气体排放量的控制,(届时地球变暖的幅度就能)控制在二摄氏度以内。

论及事情的紧迫性,以及如果不有效减排将可能面临的风险与代价,坎昆会议可谓成果寥寥。我们忙于及时行乐,哪里还顾得上子孙后代的生活质量。

No sense of urgency

The authors, in common with many other commentators making a living or reputation from climate change, seem to forget that almost all governments have agreed that greenhouse gas emissions must remain below two degrees Centigrade.

The output of Cancun was feeble when considered in the context of the increasing urgency and the cost and turbulence of failing sufficiently to reduce our emissions. It seems that we prefer self-gratification than the quality of life which our children will inherit.


中国的谈判

没有各方的倾听与努力,交易则无法达成。中国致力于对话的意愿和举动值得欢迎。然而,要让各方参与者都明确自己的责任,仍然困难重重。尤其是参与国家如此之多,情况十分复杂。

China's Negotiation

China's willingness to engage in dialogue is welcome, as deals can't get done without much listening and exploring on all sides. However, the process of introducing certainty into the expressions of goodwill by all parties is still fraught with difficulties, especially as there are so many nations involved in the potential negotiation. iPhone App CloseMyDeal gives some insightful tips on how to negotiate in any situation - http://ow.ly/3N5zR


令人咋舌的汽车消费量!

中美两国领导人整日讨论减少温室气体排放以应对全球变暖,却对气候变化的罪魁祸首-过度消费,只字不提。

奢靡的生活方式,浮夸的炫富行为对二氧化碳的大量排放难辞其咎。不仅是在北京、上海,即使是在中国西南部的二三线城市,购物街和夜店门口随处可见宾利、玛莎拉蒂和宝马这样的豪华车。

对汽车的迷恋加速了对自然资源的消耗,污染空气,导致全球气温的上升。中国共产党政府应采取以下步骤:1)控制道路上的车辆总数;2)提高废气排放标准(包括随处可见的大巴车和卡车排放的黑烟)。

把小汽车当做彰显社会身份和个人成功与否的标志,这种“大跃进”式的状况必须得到克服。回想起文革时期宣传魔力的强大,政府也完全有能力教育大众认识到过度消费对外部环境带来的影响。自行车和地铁万岁!

Conspicuous Consumption of Cars!

China and US leaders talk about reducing greenhouse gas emissions and guarding against global warming but fail to mention the main culprit of climate change; the culture of conspicuous consumption.

Lavish lifestyles and ostentatious displays of wealth are responsible for a huge portion of carbon dioxide emissions. Bentley Mazaratti and BMW luxury cars line shopping districts and nightclubs not only in Beijing and Shanghai but also throughout tier II and tier III cities in the southwest.

Automobile fetish is a force that is driving the depletion of natural resources, fouling the air and warming global temperatures. The CCP government needs to step in to a) regulate the amount of cars on the road as well as b) improving exhaust emission standards (this includes the ubiquitous black plumes of smoke from buses and trucks).

The "Great Leap Forward" is to overcome the position that automobiles have as landmarks of social status and personal success. Given the propaganda wizardry of the Cultural Revolution there's no reason why we can't see the government educating the public on the environmental externalities of conspicuous consumption. Long live the bike and metro!


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