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Balancing China’s development

China’s leadership has recognised the need to fight environmental degradation and reduce the country’s widening income gap. A green GDP index may help, argue  Zheng Yongnian & Chen Minjia, but can it be enforced?

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Since the reform and open door policy of the late 1970s, China has achieved a consistently high level of economic growth, with an average annual growth rate of over 9.5%. But the ruthless pursuit of GDP growth has been highly inefficient, causing widening income disparities and environmental degradation on a colossal scale, and resulting in insufficient industrial innovation.

These consequences put into question not only the sustainability of China’s development, but also jeopardise social stability in the country. In recent years, income disparities and environmental degradation have led to an increasing number of social protests, especially in the coastal regions. The Chinese Communist Party has tightened its political control in order to maintain stability, but the leadership also understands that it must adjust China’s development model if it is to cope with the undesirable consequences of rapid economic growth.

Environmental issues in China are becoming increasingly political, and the country is entering an era of environmental politics like many other countries before it. Demands for a healthier environment from the prosperous eastern coastal regions have become increasingly difficult to ignore.

Since the Hu Jintao—Wen Jiabao leadership came to power, China has been searching for a new development model which focuses on sustainability and social justice. China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) and the recent Sixth Plenum have both shown ‘building a harmonious society’ to be top of the leadership’s agenda.

The “green GDP” campaign is the means by which the leadership is enforcing its new policy orientation. While green GDP is not yet a widely accepted concept, the Chinese leadership is using it to try to change traditional opinions on economic development among its party cadres and government officials.

Green GDP is a figure for gross domestic product which takes environmental damage into account, and it can be expressed as a simplified calculation:

Green GDP = GDP - the costs of natural resource consumption - the costs of environmental depletion

In practice, a green GDP accounting method usually includes five natural resource consumption costs, including arable land, mineral resources, forest, water and fishery resources, and two environmental depletion costs, environmental pollution and ecological degradation.

In the light of the overheated state of the economy since 2003, green GDP is also considered to be a way of controlling local officials’ economic activities. The green GDP concept is also in line with the essential political objective of using the “scientific development” model to build a “harmonious society”. Therefore, as one observer has pointed out, the combination of social trends, macroeconomic overheating and political factors has created the conditions under which green GDP has become fashionable.

China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) recently published their first green GDP accounting report based on local experiments. However, the result remains contentious.

The concept of green GDP has not yet been scientifically justified, and how to include factors such as environmental damage and public satisfaction is very problematic. Local governments have different ways of calculating their green GDP, leading to a lack of consensus on the meaning of green GDP at the national level.

Furthermore, out of the usual 20 categories of environmental pollution, SEPA and NBS only managed to include the costs of 10, and included no ecological degradation costs at all, due to the difficulty of obtaining data and the limited techniques. It is clear that green GDP, both as a concept and a practice, is still at an early stage in China.

According to the “China Green National Accounting Study Report 2004”, environmental pollution cost China 511.8 billion yuan (about US$64 billion) in economic losses, accounting for 3.05% of the year’s GDP. The environmental costs of water pollution, air pollution, solid waste and pollution accidents accounted for 55.9%, 42.9% and 1.2% of the total costs respectively. The report also estimated that to treat this pollution, China would have had to spend as much as 287.4 billion yuan, equivalent to about 1.8% of the GDP in 2004. However, in 2004 the actual investment in waste and pollution treatment was only about 190 billion yuan. The gap between these figures cannot be ignored.

In recent decades, local GDP growth rates have been the indicator by which the central government evaluates the performance of local government officials. This evaluation system has provided the incentive for local governments to pursue local economic growth regardless of negative consequences such as environmental damage and social conflict.

Policy implementation in the provinces has always proved a difficult task for the Chinese central government. They have to provide sufficient incentives for local governments to induce them to follow central policies. As repeatedly emphasised by SEPA deputy director, Pan Yue, there is a need for the central government to introduce a new system for evaluating the performance of local governments, which would provide an incentive for government officials to change their behaviour. The old evaluation system consists of three parts with 17 items, of which only one concerns the environment. This is not sufficient to induce local government officials to take the environment into account in their decision making.

In August 2004 the Ministry of Personnel issued a research report on “The Assessment of the Chinese Government’s Efficiency”, and released an evaluation system. This system contains three parts and 11 items, each of which has three indices. It aims to improve government efficiency and states that its goal is public satisfaction. The environment still comprises only one item, but its relative importance seems higher, since it is now one out of 11 items, rather than one among 17.

An experimental version of the new evaluation system is being carried out in three provinces: Inner Mongolia (north China), Sichuan (central China), and Zhejiang (east China). The new system is expected to give substantially more weight to environmental concerns and relate them to officials’ performance in several ways:

1) local citizens’ assessment of the quality of the environment;

2) measurement of changes in quality of air and drinking water;

3) forest coverage rate in the local area;

4) local government expenditure on environmental protection;

5) the number of environment-related complaints and lawsuits;

6) the enforcement of the environmental laws.

As a long term strategy for the Chinese government, the green GDP movement in China is certainly gaining momentum. However, when it comes to enforcement, the central government will surely face daunting obstacles from local governments or even from different departments at the central level due to the divergence of their interests.

For example, during the two-year period of research leading up to the publication of the “China Green National Accounting Study Report 2004”, several provinces were extremely reluctant to cooperate with SEPA to carry out the work, or employed various ‘strategies’ to make the green GDP index factually meaningless.

Li Deshui, then the director of NBS, questioned the necessity of calculating the green GDP for China in May 2005, two months after the start of the national programme. Li’s suspicion showed a degree of inconsistency between NBS and SEPA.

When put into practice, green GDP accounting methods meet tough technical difficulties. It is very complicated, for example, to calculate the cost of pollution or the value of natural resources lost. This is one of the main reasons why a standardised green GDP accounting method has not yet been developed anywhere in the world. The technical loopholes would leave space for bureaucratic infighting in China, which would further make the future of green GDP in the country ambiguous. Seeing the technical problems, NBS, which previously questioned the necessity of the green GDP, further argued that allowing zero or even negative GDP growth for some regions could be more practical than implementing green GDP, for the sake of preventing environmental damage by short -term behaviour. 

China’s efforts with the green GDP campaign shed some light on the direction of China’s economic development for the future. However, most importantly, economic development remains the “hard truth” at the most fundamental level. How will green GDP as a concept evolve in China? Will the leadership be able to enforce it? To what degree will it improve China’s worsening environment? All these questions are yet to be answered.

 

Yongnian Zheng is professor and head of research at the Nottingham University China Policy Institute

 

Minjia Chen is a research associate at the China Policy Institute

© Copyright China Policy Institute December 2006

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Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

绿色GDP有利中国发展!

对于中国来说,绿色GDP的引入就是一个进步,即便暂时它的计算和实施还有待完善。

在中国无论是环保还是不环保的官员,他们都得承认绿色GDP是一个无法阻挡的趋势,无论他们愿不愿意这样去做。那些试图逃避责任的官员也最终会被历史所淘汰。

我对中国能实施绿色GDP很有信心,可能会有一个曲折的过程。它也有可能会造成一些腐败的发生,那这些都可能是无法避免的过程,因为绿色GDP是一个新的概念。

Green GDP benefits China!

For China, the introduction of Green GDP is already a progress, even though its accounting and implementation still need big improvement.

All Chinese officials, whether they like to take actions to protect environment or not, have to recognize that the practice of Green GDP is the tendency.

And those who intends to dodge duties will lose their positions eventually.

I am very confident with China's practice with Green GDP, but I have to say it will experience a zig-zag process. It also probably leads to some corruptions, but they are not preventable during the process of Green GDP developing to be a mature system, because it (Green GDP) is a new concept for all of us.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

如何来计算自然资本?

绿色GDP的概念中是如何来计算(因污染或水土流失影响而造成的对)濒危物种的净(代价)价值?

我喜欢绿色GDP的提法,但它就像其它振奋人心的可持续发展术语比如生态足迹一样几乎很难转化成具体和实际的操作和运用。

How do you measure a natural asset ?

How does the Green GDP calculate the net worth of, for example, an endangered species relative to something else, such as air pollution or soil erosion ?

While I love the idea of the Green GDP at an intutitive level, it, like other heady sustainability terminology like Ecological Footprint analysis seems to be hard to transform into something concrete and practical to use at a planning level.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

中央和地方关系,以及英国有个可持续发展委员会

中国政治中,历来中央和地方关系是个微妙和关键之处,对于环境这个综合性的问题,更需要深刻理解中央和地方在现今和未来中的搏弈,作为设计激励机制时的基本因素.

英国的可持续发展委员会的建制很有意思,虽然中国也有所谓挂靠在科技部的AGENDA 21等机构,但是却没有整体协调,教育和促进可持续政策制定和实施的实际功能.问题并不是建立一个什么委员会,而是个真正能起作用的机构.环境部在级别上明显不够,要知道,在中国的政治体系中,部长上面还有主管副总理,也就是部长实际是个副部级;接着,副总理似乎也不能协调各部委的工作,因为还有其他的同级别的副总理存在呢.

Relationship between the central and local governments in China

In China’s politics, the relationship between the central and local governments is delicate and crucial. To understand the issue of environmental management, one needs to take into account of the competitive relationships between the central and the local government. In the United Kingdom, there is the sustainable development committee within the government. China has a similar setting like the Agenda 21 under the supervision of Ministry of Technology, though it rarely supervise or coordinate. Agenda 21 is neither effective nor functioning as it indicates. State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”) is not powerful enough in its political ranking. Above SEPA, there is a vice premier in charge of this particular ministry as well as others. Vice premiers couldn’t coordinate the work of different ministries, because they fall into the different supervision of other vice premiers.